- Amitzur Ilan,Embargo, Power and Military Decision in the 1948 Palestine War
(Tel Aviv: MOD, 1995) [Hebrew]. - Ibid.
- Kober,Coalition Defection, 63–5.
- J. F. C. Fuller,Armament and History(New York: Scribner, 1945), 7–8.
- Avraham Ayalon, ‘Comparing 1948, 1956 and 1967’,Maarachot, 191–2 (June 1968), 8.
- Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz,The Israeli Army(London: Allen Lane, 1975),
292–5. - Opinions have ranged from defence advocates (e.g. Clausewitz), to mixed-approach
proponents (e.g. Bernhardi and Liddell Hart), to offence advocates (e.g. Napoleon,
Jomini, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Fuller). - For Sun Tzu’s and Liddell Hart’s dream ‘to subdue the enemy without fighting’, or ‘to
produce a decision without any serious fighting’, see Sun Tzu,The Art of War, trans.
Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 77; B. H. Liddell Hart,
Strategy(London: Faber & Faber, 1967), 338. - Brian Bond,Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought(London: Cassell, 1977),
- Tuvia Ben-Moshe, ‘Lidell Hart and the Israel Defense Forces: A Reappraisal’,Journal of
Contemporary History, vol. 16, no. 2 (April 1981), 369–91. - Kober,Coalition Defection, 63–5.
- Jomini recommended that ‘the principal mass of the force be moved against fractions
of the enemy’s, to attack them in succession’. Baron de Jomini,The Art of War, trans. G.
H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (1862; repr. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971), 331.
Liddell Hart explained the logic of dispersion which precedes concentration: ‘A con-
centrated effect can only be gained through an air of dispersion that causes the
dispersal of the enemy’s would-be concentration’. Basil H. Liddell Hart,Thoughts on
War(London: Faber & Faber, 1943), 202. - Dan Schueftan,A Jordanian Option(Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986) [Hebrew], 81–3.
- Tzu,The Art of War, 77–8.
- For the meaning of the term and the levels of war it refers to, see William J. Fanning,
‘The Origin of the TermBlitzkrieg: Another View’,Journal of Military History, vol. 61
(April 1997), 283–302; Samuel J. Newland, ‘Blitzkrieg in Retrospect’,Military Review,
vol. 84, no. 4 (July–August 2004), 86–9. - Luttwak and Horowitz,The Israeli Army, 175.
- See, for example, Frederick II (the Great), The King of Prussia’s Military Instruction to
his Generals, Article VI, ‘Of the Coup D’Oeil’,http://www.kw.igs.net/~tacit/artof-
war/frederick.htm#VI; Clausewitz,On War, 102. - The term ‘practical soldiers’ was coined by Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart,Thoughts on
War, 96–7. - Israeli military psychologist Reuven Gal characterizes the Israeli commander as one
lacking theoretical and historical knowledge, who is basing his professionalism on rich
experience. Reuven Gal,A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier(Westport, CT: Greenwood,
1986), 116. - William S. Lind,Maneuver Warfare Handbook(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 24.
- Martin van Creveld,The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense
Force(New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 169. - Ibid.
- Luttwak and Horowitz,The Israeli Army, 161, 174; Martin van Creveld,Command in
War(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 196–8.
The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art, 1948–2008 191