The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

32. Avi Kober, ‘The IDF in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?’Journal
    of Strategic Studies, vol. 31, no. 1 (February 2008).


33. Itay Bron, ‘Where Has Maneuver Gone?’Maarachot, 420–1 (September 2008), 13.


34. Van Creveld,The Sword and the Olive, 362–3.


35. Ibid., 363.


36. Ibid., 131.


37. Avi Kober,Israel’s Wars of Attrition(New York: Routledge, 2009), ch. 7.


38. See Shimon Naveh,In Pursuit of Military Excellence(London: Frank Cass, 1997). For the
    notion of ‘moving ideas’ or ‘attacking the enemy’s culture’ as part of an operational
    conception or activity at the operational level, see 4GW’s theorists Hammes and Lind
    et al. Thomas X. Hammes, ‘War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, in Terry Terriff et al.,
    Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict(New York: Routledge, 2008), 40;
    William S. Lind et al., ‘The Changing Face of War’, in ibid., 13–20.


39. Amir Rapaport,Friendly Fire(Tel Aviv: Maariv, 2007) [Hebrew], 80–1.


40. Benjamin Miller, ‘The Concept of Security: Should It Be Redefined?’Journal of
    StrategicStudies, vol. 24, no. 2 (June 2001), 13–42.


41. Eliot A. Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’,Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March–April
    1996), 45.


42. Avi-Shai, ‘Planning for the Yom Kippur War: Egypt’s War Objectives and Offensive
    Plan’,Maarachot, 250 (July 1976), 17–18, 37–8.


43. Until recent years, this move was attributed to the Egyptians. Ezer Weizman,On
    Eagles’ Wings(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 281. New evidence, however,
    points to it as a Soviet move. See Boris Dolin, ‘The Israeli–Soviet Campaign during the
    1969–70 Israeli–Egyptian War of Attrition’, MA thesis (Bar-Ilan University, 2008).


44. Weizman,On Eagles’ Wings, 280.


45. Van Creveld,The Sword and the Olive, 232.


46. Avi Kober,Battlefield Decision in the Arab–Israeli Wars, 1948–1982(Tel-Aviv: Maar-
    achot, 1995) [Hebrew], 365–9.


47. Ibid., 366.


48. Ibid., 367.


49. Meir Finkel,On Flexibility(Tel Aviv: MOD, 2007) [Hebrew], 194–207.


50. Chaim Herzog,The Arab–Israeli Wars(Jerusalem: Edanim, 1983) [Hebrew], 250.


51. Kober,Battlefield Decision, 413.


52. Meir Finkel, ‘The Airpower Paradox: Enhanced Precision, Lesser Effectiveness’,Maar-
    achot, 420–1 (September 2008), 30–5; Yaacov Zigdon, ‘Much Fire, Little Thought’, in
    ibid., 44–53.


53. Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor,Captives in Lebanon(Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2007)
    [Hebrew], 385.


54. On Israeli-targeted killings during the second intifada, see Avi Kober, ‘Targeted Killing
    During the Second Intifada: The Quest for Effectiveness’,Journal of Conflict Studies,
    vol. 27, no. 1 (Summer 2007),<http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?director-
    y=Summer07/& filename=jcs27art06.html>.


55. The Winograd Commission’s Final Report,<http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/pdf/ יפוס %
    20 חוד .pdf>, 273–4; Shelah and Limor,Captives in Lebanon, 198.


56. Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Where Are the Great Powers?’Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4 (July–
    August 1994), 23–8; ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’,Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3 (May–
    June 1995), 109–22; ‘A Post-Heroic Military Policy’,Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 4 (July–
    August 1996), 33–44.

192 The Evolution of Operational Art