The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

(Tina Meador) #1

  1. Mordechai Gur,Chief of the General Staff, 1974–1978(Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1998)
    [Hebrew], 404.

  2. Interview on Israeli Radio, Channel 2, 6 October 1999.
    59.http://www.btselem.org/English/Publications/Full_Text/Illusions_of_Restraint.

  3. Chief of the Authority for Weapon Research and Development (AWRD) at the Israeli
    Defence Ministry, Major-General Isaac Ben-Israel, in an interview withHaaretz,
    17 December 2001.

  4. Kober,Israel’s Wars of Attrition.

  5. Shelah and Limor,Captives in Lebanon, 132–4.

  6. Winograd Commission’s Interim Report,<http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/pdf/ דחואמ %
    20 יפוס 20% טנרטניאל .pdf>, 56.

  7. Ariella Ringel-Hoffman, ‘This Is Not How a War Should Be Conducted’,Yediot
    Aharonot Weekend Supplement, 23 March 2007; Scott Wilson, ‘Israeli War Plan Had
    No Exit Strategy’,<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/
    20/AR2006102001688 _pf.html>.

  8. Shelah and Limor,Captives in Lebanon, 244.

  9. Israeli Radio, Channel 7, 2 November 2006,<http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/
    155971 >.

  10. Amir Bouchbout, ‘Halutz’s Swords Speech’,http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/
    506/032.html
    .

  11. Isaac Ben-Israel, ‘The Military Buildup’s Theory of Relativity’,Maarachot, 352–3
    (August 1997), 33; ‘Security, Technology, and Future Battlefield’, in Haggai Golan
    (ed.),Israel’s Security Web: Core Issues of Israel’s National Security in Its Sixth Decade
    (Tel-Aviv: Maarachot, 2001) [Hebrew], 279.

  12. Shmuel Gordon,The Bow of Paris(Tel Aviv: Poalim, 1997) [Hebrew], particularly
    320–2.

  13. See Steven Metz,Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and
    Post-Modern Warfare(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000), 31–3. The
    goals set out for the US military forces a decade into the twenty-first century by former
    secretary of defence Cohen and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
    Shalikashvili were that they possess ‘dominant battlefield knowledge’, ‘full dimensional
    protection’, ‘dominant manoeuvre’, and ‘precision strike’ ability from long distances.
    Michael O’ Hanlon,Technological Change and the Future of War(Washington, DC:
    Brookings Institution, 2000). See also Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, ‘War
    in the Information Age’,Military Review, vol. 74, no. 4 (April 1994), 55–6.

  14. Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer, interview with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert,
    Yediot Aharonot New Year Supplement, 29 September 2008.
    72.The Officer’s Manual: Military Maxims of Napoleon, trans. Colonel d’Aguillar (Dublin:
    Richard Milliken, 1831), 27.

  15. Benny Mem, ‘The Peace for Galilee War: Main Operations’,Maarachot, 284 (Septem-
    ber 1982), 24–48.

  16. Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Misreading the Lebanon War’,Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2006.

  17. Haim Assa and Yedidya Yaari,Diffused Warfare(Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2005)
    [Hebrew].

  18. Edward A. Smith,Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace,
    Crisis, and War(Washington, DC: Department of Defense Command and Control
    Research Program, 2002).

  19. Effect is defined as ‘the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or
    consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions’. EBO is


The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art, 1948–2008 193
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