breakthroughs in siege warfare, these fortifications were quite effective in warding
off enemies. But such fortifications did not negate the need for periodic expedi-
tionary warfare against adversaries. Such structures provided locations for garri-
soning troops and useful bases from which to launch mobile operations into the
steppes.
While perhaps the most famous military legacy of the Ming dynasty is posi-
tional—the ‘Great Wall’ (see previous section)—this dynasty also engaged in a
significant number of mobile campaigns. But as military engineers know, one
well-constructed and sturdy fortification does not guarantee security. A system of
fortifications was necessary—defence in depth—to protect China from nomadic
raiders and invaders from the steppe. The Hongwu Emperor (1368–98) estab-
lished a network of ‘eight outer garrisons’ as well as an inner line of forts. But
construction of the ‘Great Wall’ would not happen for another 100 years. 56
Wall building during the Ming was the result of domestic political compro-
mise. Constructing fortifications was less expensive than all-out offensive opera-
tions against the Central Asian nomads. Following a court decision in 1472, a
concerted initiative of wall building commenced. Two walls were completed in
1474, one 566 miles long and another 129 miles in length. 57 But periodic mobile
operations into the steppe were also required as well as bribes and the granting of
trading privileges. Thus, the Ming did not exclusively rely on walls; rather, a
combination of positional warfare and mobile operations more or less succeeded
in keeping the nomads at bay. Of course, these combined efforts required
constant vigilance, attention, and a steady stream of resources, something that
court politics made impossible to sustain indefinitely. 58
Complete reliance on positional warfare is never advisable, especially for the
weaker side. Mobile warfare, including operations to limit or curtail the mobility
of one’s adversary, was well worth attempting if possible. Napoleon is supposed to
have remarked that armies march on their stomachs. Most Chinese military
thinkers were clearly in agreement with this view, recognizing that campaigns
of manoeuvre required extensive and well-conceived logistical operations. Sun Zi
in chapter 2 ofThe Art of Warsuggested a ratio of one wagon of provisions for
every 100 troops, and in chapter 7 he soberly observed ‘...that an army which
lacks heavy equipment, fodder, food and stores will be lost’. Noting the difficulties
and expense of provisioning one’s forces, Sun Zi counselled (in chapter 2) that a
‘wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy’ because ‘enemy fodder’
was far more cost-effective than bringing one’s own supplies. 59 Located in the
‘Provisions’ section ofOne Hundred Unorthodox Strategies, one can find what
Ralph Sawyer calls the ‘most famous incendiary raid in Chinese history’. The
episode took place in the Later Han (during the second century AD); General
Ts’ao Ts’ao commanded a vastly outnumbered force that was exhausted and very
low on supplies. Facing a desperate situation, they were suddenly handed a piece
of vital intelligence by a defector: a vulnerable supply train of 10,000 wagons,
guarded by a modest escort, was located nearby. Ts’ao Ts’ao decided to seize the
enemy supplies. He led 5,000 cavalry disguised as enemy forces in a daring night-
time operation. The audacious action achieved maximum surprise and shock
210 The Evolution of Operational Art