regroup as well as the importance of Chinese generals needing to reassess opera-
tional imperatives, Mao insisted CPV commander Peng Dehuai press forward
and win a quick victory. Aside from the simple matter of Chinese troops being
exhausted from incessant marching and fighting in an alien land, just as serious
was the fact that these forces had run low on food and ammunition. Logistics are
a critical dimension in any kind of warfare, especially in mobile operations where
forces are moving rapidly and further from their home base. The problem in
Korea was particularly acute because logistics had not been given due attention,
since, historically, supply had not been a monumental issue when Communist
forces were operating inside China. During the Chinese Civil War, soldiers either
operated in close proximity to a base area, could live off the land, and/or survived
on captured enemy foodstuffs and equipment. 63 During the five mobile cam-
paigns in Korea, poor logistics severely hampered operations. Soldiers did not get
enough food, warm clothing, or ammunition. 64
Eventually, the war became bogged down in a bloody positional conflict
between massed infantry and high-powered artillery operating from heavily
fortified positions. Ultimately, the war ended in a stalemate with neither side
able to break through the other’s intricate network of trenches and tunnels.
The same logistical inadequacies noted in Korea also emerged two decades later
to hamper mobile operations during the attack on Vietnam. Soldiers reportedly
had to go without food or drinking water for extended periods because of
stretched supply lines. While, in 1950, Chinese armies were battle tested and
experienced in matters of command, control, and communication from decades
of guerrilla combat and years of large-scale conventional operations against
Nationalist forces, the same was not true in 1979. In Vietnam, orders were
confused, coordination between units was poor, and radios routinely did not
function. The irony was that distances in the theatre of operations were far
shorter—albeit along a 600-mile front—in 1979 than they had been in the
1950s in Korea. 65
While Chinese operational art has revealed a preference for mobile warfare,
positional warfare has proved to be an important dimension for successful
Chinese commanders.
Theatrical production or waging real war?
How does one measure victory? Is the criterion of success inflicting a crushing
defeat on your adversary or demonstrating one’s steely resolve? Is Chinese war
fighting more about ‘saving face’ or achieving overwhelming victory on the field
of battle? Some scholars contend that, for the Chinese, war is all about symbolism
and call to mind the drama and spectacle of Chinese opera. 66 Other scholars insist
that Chinese military operations, at least in the contemporary era, are about
battles of annihilation and wars of attrition. 67 The reality seems to be a combina-
tion. At times, the purpose of an artillery barrage or attack seems to be for
propaganda—to put on a display of the regime’s resolve for the benefit of the212 The Evolution of Operational Art