value and was not only a great victory, but proved to be the ‘turning point’ of the
entire campaign. 60
Moreover, for much of its history, China has been plagued by banditry, piracy,
and rebellion, often with a thin line separating them. Bandits could claim to be
rebels, and outlaws could evolve into rebels. Both outlaws and rebels relied on
superior mobility to survive larger and better-equipped forces of the ruling
dynasty. One of the most famous pirates was Zheng Chenggong or Koxinga
who proved a thorn in the side of the Manchu Qing dynasty during its early
years (mid-seventeenth century) from his base on the island of Taiwan. Koxinga
derived significant support from his claim to be fighting to restore the Ming dynasty
by battling the Manchu invaders. A famous rebel was Hong Xiuquan, who spear-
headed the Taiping Rebellion and waged a protracted fourteen-year-long armed
insurrection against the Qing dynasty. Starting in 1850, Hong successfully wrested
control over much of southern China establishing his capital in Nanjing. The
Taipings were eventually defeated in 1864.
The Communists, of course, tapped into this tradition of insurgency and
banditry for inspiration. Mao argued that Chinese history was a record of peasant
uprisings and claimed that the CCP was heir to a glorious revolutionary tradi-
tion. It was precisely in the spirit of motivating and instructing his forces that
Mao articulated the essence of his operational art as follows:
The enemy advances, we retreat;
The enemy camps, we harass;
The enemy tires, we attack;
The enemy retreats, we pursue. 61The pithy slogan encapsulated the mobile operations the Communists endea-
voured to practise in a simple and straightforward way that uneducated peasants
could easily grasp.
Mobility is especially important in guerrilla warfare so that units can quickly
move and disperse forces in order to avoid posing as a big target and hence being
visible and vulnerable to attack. Moreover, mobility enabled dispersed forces to
rapidly concentrate at a decisive point for attack. 62
Once the CCP had seized power and the insurgents had become the regime,
positional warfare became more important. China’s cities, infrastructure, and
borders switched from targets for attack to facilities requiring protection. Still,
this marked a change at the strategic level since the Communists did not have
expansionist goals beyond the territory they claimed (Taiwan, Tibet, etc.) as being
part and parcel of China historically.
What did not change was a Communist operational preference to be on the
move and seizing the initiative. This penchant can be clearly seen in the first eight
months (October 1950–May 1951) of China’s intervention in Korea with the
launching of a series of no less than five offensives. The initial two campaigns—
launched in October and November 1950—yielded remarkable successes, with
the CPV recapturing Pyongyang and pushing the UNC forces back to the 38th
parallel. However, instead of recognizing that the CPV needed time to rest and
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