cotted it (Akram, 1996: 415–16), claimed that he had manipulated
it to his advantage (Rubin, 1995a: 273), but its problem was actu-
ally a deeper one, which would have exposed it to denunciation by
whoever was disappointed by the outcome: as an unelected body, it
could not claim to be representative.
The Islamabad Accord
With casualties rising in Kabul, and the wider world largely indif-
ferent to what was happening, Rabbani’s government faced a real
dilemma. On the one hand, it could continue to strike at
Hekmatyar’s forces. On the other, it could seek some sort of
accommodation with him. Under intense pressure from Pakistan to
compromise, Rabbani signed an agreement in Islamabad on 7
March 1993 with Hekmatyar and the representatives of five other
resistance groups, providing for Hekmatyar to assume the office of
Prime Minister and form a Cabinet ‘in consultations with the
President, and leaders of Mujahideen parties’ (United Nations,
1993a). It was much more professionally drafted than the Peshawar
Accord, but still failed to address the root causes of the ongoing
instability (see Maley, 1993b: 388–90).
First, the Accord did not address Hekmatyar’s spoiling capacity
by putting in place a mechanism for the monitored removal of his
armed forces from the Kabul area. Second, the Accord was not the
product of consensus amongst Afghanistan’s elites, but of external
pressure, especially from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Third, the
Accord failed to develop a workable set of interim political
arrangements. It assumed the existence of consensus when in fact
there was none. By creating two ostensibly ‘strong’ executive
offices, it invited further conflict. By mid-April 1993, Hezb-e
Islamirockets were again falling on Kabul, and Hekmatyar was
again threatening war if his desire to marginalise Massoud by put-
ting the Defence Ministry under collegial control were not granted
(BBC Summary of World BroadcastsFE/1664/B/1, 16 April 1993).
Rabbani finally buckled on 20 May, when a compromise reached
in Jalalabad provided for the Defence and Interior Ministries to be
The Rise and Fall of the Rabbani Government, 1992–1996 199