placed under the control of ‘commissions’ for two months, after
which ministers would be elected by a meeting of resistance com-
manders. Of course, the deadline passed without any such elections
being held. Finally, the symbolism of the March 1993 agreement
was lamentable. The message it supplied was that spoilers could
expect to be rewarded. Unless one is sure that there is only one
spoiler to appease, this is an exceedingly dangerous message to
broadcast.
Distrust and manipulation in the absence of a state
The attempt to ground political power in an elite settlement failed
for three reasons. The first was that the level of distrust within the
elite was too high, especially between Hekmatyar and Massoud
(Edwards, 2002: 243–4; 288). In Hekmatyar’s case, the explan-
ation was largely pathological: Stalin once remarked ‘I trust no
one, not even myself’, and there were definite echoes of this in
Hekmatyar’s approach to the world. In the case of Massoud, the
explanation was more rational. Trust is a product of expectations
(Maley, 2002a), and Hekmatyar had given Massoud excellent
grounds to be wary, not only through the killing of commanders in
1989 and his spokesman’s candid anti-Massoud statement in April
1992, but through a sustained and documented record of using vio-
lence to eliminate or intimidate those in the Afghan resistance who
would not subordinate themselves to him (see Human Rights
Watch, 1991: 101–3, 110–11).
The second problem for an elite settlement was the impact of
external powers, which affected the identities of the participantsin
the settlement. Officials in Pakistan, the host of the talks which led
to the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords, had long held the view
that Afghan opinion should be articulated through political parties.
But by 1992–93, other actors – such as Dostam, Ismail Khan in
Herat, and diverse shuras in different parts of the country – had
emerged on the scene, and their absence from the negotiations
undermined the legitimacy of the final output. Those groups which
felt marginalised were more likely to seek foreign patrons than
200 The Afghanistan Wars