neatly put it, were geared to ‘a theater war against a modern enemy
who would obligingly occupy defensive positions stretching across
the northern European plain’ (Grau, 1998: 201). In the early years
of the war, major infantry sweeps were conducted, as we shall
shortly see, but they did not deliver ‘control’ of the countryside in a
meaningful sense: on the contrary, ‘control’ tended to revert to anti-
regime forces with alarming speed once the Soviet infantry moved
to a new destination. In 1983, significant changes were effected in
the organisation of counter-insurgency operations: ‘Rather than
drive the mujahedinfrom the countryside, the Soviets elected to
drive off the population’ (McMichael, 1991: 51). However, this was
the diametric opposite of a ‘hearts and minds’ approach, and thus
constituted a dead-end from a political perspective. Furthermore,
infantry operations are vulnerable if not reinforced by appropriate
armoured and aerial support. In Afghanistan, this was by no means
always available, and as a result, the Soviet force suffered many
avoidable casualties. It is not surprising that as the war went on,
infantry became heavily involved in the defence of outposts and
communications lines, which involved 35 per cent of the Soviet
forces (Sarin and Dvoretsky, 1993: 92), and in the exercise of con-
trol in urban areas. Each was a thankless task.
Armour
Visiting Afghanistan even years after the Soviet withdrawal
reminds one of the role which armour played during the war.
Wrecked tanks and armoured personnel carriers litter the country-
side, providing scrap metal for enterprising Afghans. The main-
stays of Soviet armour in Afghanistan were the T-55, T-62, and
T-72 tanks; the BMP-2 (Boevaia mashina pekhoty), a tracked ve-
hicle; and the BTR-70 and BTR-80 (Bronetransporter), a wheeled
vehicle. BMPs were highly vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades
because they were so packed with fuel and ammunition.
Afghanistan’s stark terrain militated against the use of massed
tanks, and armour was instead used for convoy escort purposes,
and to spearhead combined operations (Isby, 1989: 68–9). In what
Soviet Strategy, Tactics, and Dilemmas 47