came to be known as the ‘bronegruppaconcept’, it proved feasible
‘to use the firepower of the personnel carriers in an independent
reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dismounted’ (Grau,
1998: 203). This was probably the most notable Soviet innovation
in the area of armour. Vehicles were also used to move troops, but
the desire to keep troops and their transport together initially ham-
pered infantryoperations, given the obstacles to vehicle mobility
posed by the terrain. Here, there was a need for a greater volume
of air assets to complement infantry operations. However, air
assets in sufficient supply were not forthcoming.
Tactical airpower
Air assets, both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, were used by
Soviet forces to lethal effect in Afghanistan, although rarely in
such a way as to advance the USSR’s political objectives. While
aircraft were used extensively for resupply purposes in
Afghanistan, and for bombardments to depopulate important rural
areas, their main use was in support of ground operations. The
main helicopters used were Mi-24 (‘Hinds’), which carried four
anti-tank missiles, had a maximum speed of 275 km/h, and a 300
km range. With a crew of two, they could carry 8–10 troops.
Fixed-wing aircraft came in different forms; while Tu-16 and Su-
24 bombers operated from bases in the USSR itself, MiG-23/27
(‘Flogger’) and Su-25 (‘Frogfoot’) aircraft were deployed in
Afghanistan from 1980. As McMichael puts it: ‘Attack aircraft
were used most often for planned strikes against clearly identified
targets, while helicopters performed the majority of on-call strikes’
(McMichael, 1991: 83). Directed against the civilian population,
these assets proved lethally effective; they were somewhat less
effective against smaller resistance groups. The main problem was
shortage of assets. Grau concludes that ‘the Soviet Army never
brought in enough helicopters and air assault forces to perform all
the necessary missions’, and that ‘airborne and air assault forces
were usually understrength’ (Grau, 1998: 203–4). Furthermore,
from late 1986, the supply of Stinger missiles to the Afghan resist-
48 The Afghanistan Wars