ance forced Soviet aircraft to take evasive actions which to a
degree compromised their military effectiveness.
Spetsnaz forces and sabotage
The expanded use of Spetsnaz forces in Afghanistan marked an
important turning point. With the increased use of Spetsnaz forces,
the USSR moved towards overcoming one of its greatest weak-
nesses, namely the limited autonomy granted to relatively small
groups of troops in a theatre of operations in which flexibility and
local initiative were vital (Urban, 1990: 65). They formed the core
of a more specialised counter-insurgency force, which, comprising
not only Spetsnaz but also airborne, air assault, and designated
reconnaissance troops, came to total between 15 per cent and 20
per cent of the force. Two brigades, with eight distinct Spetsnaz
battalions, were deployed in Afghanistan, and each battalion had
its own zone of responsibility. In Spring 1985, Spetsnaz forces
were deployed along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border with a view
to attempting to close it; more than 60 per cent of Afghanistan’s
borders with Pakistan fell under Spetsnaz control (Gromov, 1994:
199). The Spetsnaz forces were better equipped and trained than
their regular counterparts. However, they also suffered their losses,
and Gromov recalled three occasions on which Spetsnaz groups
were completely wiped out by resistance groups (Gromov, 1994:
203), usually because of isolation from armour or air cover. On
occasion, too, the benefits of surprise were lost, with Spetsnaz
forces inserted only after a period of bombing and reconnaissance.
This may have minimised casualties on the Soviet side, but it also
allowed the most accomplished resistance forces to make good
their escape (Grau, 1998: 59). In addition, Spetsnaz operations
were on occasion complicated by acute tensions between Spetsnaz
soldiers and regular infantry officers (Schofield, 1993: 99–104).
Scorched earth
When Soviet forces opted ‘to drive off the population’, they set
about doing it in some of the most barbarous ways one could
Soviet Strategy, Tactics, and Dilemmas 49