8 Gentlemen to Officers:laimed Ensign A. I. Odoyevsky, a noted poet. Their civic heroism, as one
torian puts it, was tinged with oriental fatalism.so
rbe northerners' plan, such as it was, called for secret society members in
1se units that had been most extensively 'penetrated' to bring their men out
the fraudulent pretext that the oath to Nicholas was illegal. This, it was
ped, would encourage other regiments to follow their example, and create
1ditions in which the insurgent leaders could impose their constitutional
;igns on the Senate.s^1 The scheme might just conceivably have worked-if
: cadres had been as resolutely committed to the cause as the organizers
ped. But this was not the case. Of the Moscow regiment only four com-
nies (671 men in all) were induced to join the movement. This was less than a
arter of the unit's total strength. In the First Grenadiers the proportion was
:her (over 40 per cent), but significantly only two of the insurgent officers
re members of the society; one (Lieutenant N. A. Panov) happened to be
: adjutant and the other officers obeyed him more or less mechanically. In
: naval infantry there was a good turn-out (approximately I, 100 men out of
•Ossible 1,280), but only one officer (Lieutenant A. P. Arbuzov) belonged to
! conspiratorial network.^82 The Finland regiment remained neutral,
hough Lieutenant Obolensky, a prominent member of the society, was serv-
~ in it.83 Colonel Trubetskoy, hurriedly named provisional dictator, took
ght and abandoned his post, and there were several other notable defectors.
together the rebels had an estimated 30 officers, all but one of them
balterns, and 2,850 soldiers. They found themselves confronting a govern-
!nt force potentially about three times as strong.^84
Even so odds were not so unfavourable as it may seem. Morale was uncer-
.n in both forces. On the insurgent side most soldiers did not know what was
pected of them. Typically, the rebel chiefs had made no arrangements to
~d their men, who were left standing for hours to no apparent purpose on the
ntry Senate Square. The leadership shown on the government side was not
llCh better, but Nicholas and his staff were under less compulsion to act
1ickly. They first tried to persuade the rebels to surrender peacefully. These
lks failed, as did a cavalry charge. With dusk falling the mood of the civilian
1lookers became uncertain. Artillery was brought up, and after a final warn-
g the cannon opened fire.^85
The insurgents fell or fled-and were quickly rounded up, along with a
1mber of spectators. Exact casualty figures are unknown, for many of the
1dies of those killed were thrust beneath the ice of the Neva. One estimate
its insurgent losses at 70-80, including 13 fatalities.^86
110 Mazour, Fiw Run. Rel'lll., p. 184.
81 Zavalishin, Zapis/\i, pp. 190-1. ~" Gabaye>, '(ivardiya', pp. 175-9.
8l Lieutenant E. A. Rozen led two and a half companies 10 a bridge a..:ross the Neva where they
lted and merely observed 1he a..:1ion. For his biography: G. R. Barra1t, Rebel 011 the Bridge,
mdon, 1975. ~^4 Gabayev, 'Gvardiya', p. 181.
85 Ibid., p. 186; Ma10ur, Firn Rus.1. Rem/., pp. 175-80. For a vim from 1he government side:
'l'kner, 'Zapiski' (not u~ed liy Marnur). Sh Gabayev, 'Gvardiya', p. 191.