The Army Takes to the Countryside 281
In 1784 military settlers accounted for a sizeable proportion of rhe popula-
tion of Yekaterinoslav governor-generalship (namesmichestvo). Of 352,000
male taxpayers 160,000 were categorized as military settlers (voinskiye
poselyane) and another 2,000 as 'seiilcd ~uldic1 ~' (1m:aning veterans); this was
equivalent to 46.0 per cent. They were distributed unevenly, with the heaviest
concentrations on either bank of the Dnieper above the rapids. This figure
excludes 19,000 'single-homesteaders', who in 1787 were reclassified as state
peasants; they too had military obligations and some of them were even turnedinto Cossacks.^18 In (^1788) a number of ecclesiastical peasants, and even 4,000
'surplus clergy', were likewise assigned the status of military settlers, as were
some privately-owned serfs.^19 By 1801, within slightly different territorial
boundaries, the percentage of 'militarized settlers' (Druzhinina's term) had
declined to 33 .6 per cent: in round figures, 152,000 males out of 452,000. (^20) A
quarter-century later (1827) a further diminution had taken place, to 27 .4 per
cent: 195,000 out of a total male population that had now risen to 712,000.21
The trend to civilianization was slow but unmistakable.
Russia's successes in the south during Catherine's reign suggest that the
settlement system proved its worth in conventional military terms: it provided
men and (presumably) supplies for troops who had to fight in a theatre remote
from major centres of population and resources. Whether the settlers achieved
their economic objectives is less certain-one modern authority states firmly
that 'despite heavy initial subsidies, the regiments never attained the degree of
self-support for which the Imperial authorities had ... hoped' (^22) -but contem-
poraries could plausibly blame the shortcomings on external factors that had
disrupted orderly management.
It does not appear that any official investigation into the merits of these
policies was undertaken during the reigns of either Paul or Alexander I,
despite-or perhaps because of-the fact that high-level opinion about them
was divided. This lapse was to prove a serious defect when the idea was taken
up again after the peace of Tilsit in 1807, and on a much greater scale after
1816-with other areas of the empire in view, and for motives that differed
considerably from those of the eighteenth-century pioneers.
Already in 1778, while still tsarevich, Paul had praised the Prussian 'canton'
system, which he saw as a superior alternative to general recruitment. He sug-
gested that one-quarter to one-third of the men in each regiment could be
released from active duty during the winter months. Both the soldiers and the
state, he thought, stood to benefit: the men's mo1ale would improve and the
18 Druzhinina, Sev. Prichernomor'.ve, pp. 158, 187.
19 PSZ xxii. 16605, 16607, 16646, 16650 (8, 14 Jan., 19, 25 Apr. 1788l; Druzhinina, Se1·.
Prichernomor'ye, pp. 127, 189.
::o Druzhinina, 'ru:;./maya Ukrama, p. 70. These include 31,500 Cossacks but exclude the: former
'single-homesteaders'-and the regular troops stationed in the area.
::1 Druzhinina, Yu::.hnaya Ukraina, p. 167.
::2 :'vlenning, 'Mil. Institutions', p. 16.