282 The Military Settlements
authorities could give proper supervision and care to their children and to
vi:-t~r~n~. F.~rh ~rmy-ther~ \'/ere to be four of them-'Ncu!d have a reserve
from which regiments could draw reinforcements as and when required. 23
Some enthusiasts attached special importance to the last point. The soldiers'
male offspring would be so numerous, and so well adjusted to the military
environment, that they could in time supply all the army's needs; in this way
the burdensome levy system could be done away with. Potemkin dreamed of
'an inexhaustible flow of warriors in lieu of recruits'.^24 Advocates of this
utopian view did not bother their heads with demographic projections, or even
ask themselves whether the armed forces' vast intake was really necessary. It
was in a similar spirit of insouciance and vague benevolence, combined with a
very real concern for state interest, that Alexander I approached the question
of military settlements.
From 1802 onwards, as we know, the army rapidly increased in size, partly to
make up for the unprecedentedly heavy casualties suffered in the first encounters
with Napoleon (1805-7). By 1808 the armed forces were absorbing 56. l per
cent of total state expenditure, as against 40.2 per cent five years earlier.^25 The
need for economy was self-evident. Several thoughtful military leaders shared
the tsar's anxiety about the demoralizing effect of the levy system. The insti-
tution of recruit depots in 1808 (see ch. 7) was clearly no more than a palliative.
In the same year Lieutenant-General M. A. Obreskov suggested the creation
of a reserve, to be made up of men who had completed seven years' active
service,^26 but nothing came of the idea. No better success attended N. S.
Mordvinov, Minister of the Navy and a dogged framer of reform proposals,
who in 1810 advocated that certain troops be set aside to produce food for the
rest.^27 Instead Alexander turned to Arakcheyev. In June of that year he visited
his friend's estate at Gruzino (Novgorod province), which was run on strict
military lines and had the reputation of a model establishment. The visit con-
vinced the tsar that Arakcheyev's disciplinarian methods were suited for
general application. A scheme was taking shape in his mind for a nation-wide
system of military settlements, and his former War Minister seemed the logical
person to run them.^2 R Characteristically, Alexander was most impressed by the
superficial features of the arrangements at Gruzino: 'the order that prevails
everywhere, the cleanliness, the construction of roads and plantations, the
symmetry and smartness we saw on every hand'.^29 His idea was to cover Russia
2) Paul 10 P. Panin. IO May, 14 Scpl. 1778, 'Perepi~ka', pp. 407, 413; Barskov. 'Proyekty',
p. 119.
24 Potemkin. Bw11aRi (Shornik voyenno·i~t. materialov, 6, 1893), p. 120, as cited by
Druzhinina, Sev. Prichernomor )·e, p. 127.
25 Keep, 'Russian Army's Response', p. 521.
2~ Bogdanovich, 'Ob umen'shenii', pp. 245-51; Yevstaf'yev, Vosstaniye, pp. 35-6.
27 Arkhiv gr. Mord1·inorykh, 4 (St. Petersburg, 1902), pp. 13-15; Yevstaf'yev, Vosstaniye,
p. 36; Shchepetil"nikov, in SVM iv (I. i. ii), pp. 93-7.
28 Shirder, Aleksandr I, iv. 24; Yevstaf'yev, Vosstaniye, p. 37; Jenkins, Arakcheev, pp. 143-6.
29 Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhaylovich, Correspondante de l'Empereur Alexandre fer avec sa
SCPUr, la Grande D11ches1e Cather111e, St. Petersburg, 19!0, pp. 32-3.
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