354 Towards a Modern Army, 1825-1874
military expenditure.^13 The armed forces bore their share of the savings made
in the intervening period, for their expenditure in 1857-61 fell by 13.7 per cent
of that in 1854-6 while civilian expenditure grew by 76.2 per cent.^14 Forestt
Miller, who relies on Bliokh's statistics, gives a contrary impression, stating
that 'the army [hadj no effective pru~n1111111t: for reducing its size in
peacetime'.^15 This is unfair, for although the War Minister did indeed resist
pressure by his colleagues for economy, troop strength was significantly
reduced. In 1856 the militia was disbanded, as were several Cossack units;
421,000 regulars were sent on indefinite leave, many of them before their term
had expired, and another 69,000 crossed off the lists altogether. By temporarily
desisting from recruit levies and reducing the service term (see below, p. 375)
the army's strength was brought down from l. 7 million in 1856 to less than
l million in 1858, and to 850,000 in 1859.^16
One reason why military expenditure failed to drop as rapidly as troop
strength was that the authorities launched a programme.of re-equipping the
forces with modern weapons. By 1859 each infantryman and most cavalrymen
had been issued with a rifle, which is said to have made such soldiers 'masters
of the field' against foes less well armed; the artillery also received guns (of
bronze, later of steel) which had a longer range and were more efficient.^17 In
1859 7.5 million roubles was spent on what were delicately termed 'special
objects', and the following year this sum nearly doubled.^18
A great deal of attention was given to improving the army's administration.
The need for this had been urged in the first report submitted to the tsar, on 4
June 1855, by-the commander-in-chief of the Guards and Grenadier Corps,
Lieutenant-General F. V. Ridiger (Friedrich Rudiger). His age, seniority, and
battle honours (and perhaps also his Baltic German background) allowed him
to speak more freely than his colleagues were yet prepared to do. He blamed
the abuses primarily on the excessive centralization of authority, which over-
burdened subordinate agencies and deprived unit commanders of initiative,
and secondarily on inadequate training. There was too much emphasis on drill
at the expense of firing practice, and the entire military educational system,
for men as well as officers, needed overhauling. Army regulations should be
revised and-the most delicate point-officers' qualifications for their posts
reviewed.^19 In July 1855 a commission was set up to examine these and other
13 Min. finansov, i. 636; Beskrovnyy, Potentsial, p. 483; Bliokh (Finansy, ii. 91) puts the 1862
deficit at 11.9 m. roubles.
14 Calculated from Min. finansov, loc. cit.
is Miller, Miliutin, pp. 27-8.
16 Bogdanovich, /st. ocherk, i. 121-58, app. 5, 15; VOVM 1858, pp. 1-3; Kersnovsky, lstoriya,
ii. 395.
11 Zayonchkovsky, 'Milyutin: biograf. ocherk', p. 30; Kersnovsky, Istoriya, ii. 397; Beskrovnyy,
Potentsial, pp. 144, 155; II PSZ xxx. 28998 (30 Jan. 1855); xxxiii. 33257 (5 June 1858); xxxiv.
34599 (10 June 1859).
18 Bliokh, Finansy, ii. 58.
19 N. A. Danilov, in SVM i. 382; app. pp. 33, 39; Zayonchkovsky, Voyennye reformy,
pp. 64-6; RBS xvi. 171.
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(Wang)
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