An Age of Reform 355
ideas, and once peace had been concluded a purge got under way. Senior
generals who held sinecures were obliged to retire.^20 One of the main targets
was the Internal Guard. This unpopular force was placed under another Baltic
German general (V. F. von der Launitz) and subjected to a thorough
reorganization, which p11.:1V1::u lu be bur a preiude to its abohtion in 1864. An
investigation revealed that 16,400 men, or 11.5 per cent of its strength, were
corrupt and that criminal offences were six times more frequent in the corps
than they were in line units. Most of the men were formally pardoned,
reclassified as Cossacks, and sent in batches to settle the coastal region recently
annexed from China; they were allowed to take their wives and received grants
to help them start a new Iife.^21
The supply administration was another obvious candidate for the reformers'
zeal. Some of the more conspicuous suspects were prosecuted: 776 officers
(not all in the commissariat) were charged with 'offences against the service' in
the seven years 1855-61.^22 A contemporary military critic noted that this 'cam-
paign against the intendanty' left untouched a number of the major culprits,
among them a guards colonel who, having accumulated a sizeable fortune by
various manipulations, on retirement built himself a manor-house with 70
rooms.^23 Still, the opportunities for malfeasance were reduced. Purchasing
arrangements were revised to ensure that the army obtained the bulk of the
cereal products it consumed at public auctions instead of from individual sup-
pliers under Jong-term contracts.^24 At unit level commanding officers were
deprived of responsibility for economic matters, which initially produced an
improvement-or so at least one infantry subaltern noted. No longer, he
claimed, could a CO keep fewer horses or order more ammunition than officially
prescribed, or delay the issue of new uniforms to his men-all devices that had
been widely used for self-enrichment. Companies now received their allocations
of firewood, boots, and underclothing, along with their pay, directly from the
supply authorities instead of through regimental headquarters. Most striking
here is the frankness with which the writer reveals details of previous abuses
and his naive trust in the efficacy of such elementary remedial measures.^25
In general the reformers, high and low, placed too much confidence in mere
administrative changes. There was certainly a need to decentralize the top-
heavy military establishment, but this came to be seen as something of
a panacea, or as a substitute for more sweeping measures that might disturb
conservatives. Nor was the army leadership of one mind. The War Minister,
N. 0. Sukhozanet, dragged his feet on organizational reforms, just as he did
20 II PSZ xxxi. 30792, 30831 (28 July, 8 Aug. 1856).
21 II PSZ xx.xiv. 33163 (18 May 1858); Bogdanovich, !st. ocherk, i. 144, ii. 444-8; VOVM 1858,
pp. 50-3; 1861, p. 63; VE vi. 443.
u Bogdanovich, !st. ocherk, ii. app. 32.
23 Neizvestnyy, 'Za mnogo let', RS 83 (1894), 10, pp. 69-80. _
24 VOVM 1858, p. 103; 1864, p. 22; 1870, p. 22; Bogdanovich, !st. ocherk, ii. 147-59.
25 Apolev, 'Ocherki', pp. 1-40; cf. Bogdanovich, !st. ocherk, ii. 172.