356 Towards a Modern Army, 1825-1874
on curbing military expenditure.^26 His appointment in^1856 was apparently
designed to appease the right-wingers, for it would have been more logical if
the tsar had entrusted the job to A. I. Baryatinsky, his chief confidant in
................ milit,:irv -.J ---------· m"'ttPr<: R11t ---R"'rvMim:kv --·-.,,---------., w::ic: -·- ::innnintf'ci ··rr·--···· vie-Prov ----,, of - the C:::111ca•ms_ •
where the war was about to be stepped up; and he took his protege Milyutin
with him as acting chief of staff. The latter had his eye on a senior post in the
ministry and was frustrated at Sukhozanet's uncooperative attitude.^27 While
he was absent from St. Petersburg the drive for reform slackened. On the
other hand, while in the war zone Milyutin had the chance to set up military
districts, to which power within the Caucasian Army could be devolved; many
of the worst abuses were remedied and subordinate officers encouraged to
show greater initiative; several hundred men were sent on courses to learn the
use of the new weapons, as well as gymnastics, grammar, and arithmetic.^28
The defeat and capture of the formidable imam Shami! in 1859 seemed to vin-
dicate his methods, which he was more certain than ever should be extended to
the whole empire.
On the strength of these successes Baryatinsky put Milyutin forward for the
job of War Minister, but a year passed before he was appointed Sukhozanet's
deputy. The older man still refused to give him anything important to do, and
it took another year of bureaucratic intrigue before the minister was shunted
off to take charge of the restless Poles; thereupon Milyutin succeeded him,
first de facto and then de Jure (May, November 1861).^29 Similar fontroversy
would attend his direction of the ministry over the next 20 years. Conservatives
resented him as a 'desk general' who lacked 'a soldierly heart'^30 -although he
had in fact been wounded in action. Milyutin faced criticism from the left, too,
although in the nature of things this was less sustained or articulate. In a curious
way the two groups of opponents reinforced each other.
The new minister lost no time in preparing a lengthy memorandum which he
presented to the tsar on^15 January 1862.^31 In this he amplified the ideas he
had advanced six years earlier. The army's efficiency was to be improved by
eliminating wasteful and expensive practices. Transition to a relatively small
cadre force, supplemented by a large reserve, would require a major devolution
of authority to new military districts (okruga). Their chiefs' job was to mobilize
these reserves when needed and to administer all the regular troops stationed
within their area; they were also to replace military governors and the com-
manders of corps (the largest tactical unit, which was to be abolished). This
highly contentious measure need not be considered further here,^32 except to
26 Kersnovsky, lstoriya, ii. 397. For a sensitive appreciation of his ministry see E. W. Brooks,
'Reform in the Russian Army, 1856-1861', SR^43 (1984), pp. 63-82.
27 Zayonchkovsky, 'Milyutin: biograf. ocherk', p. 18.
28 Rieber, Politics of Autocracy, pp. 62-8; Miller, Miliutin, pp. 29-32; II PSZ xxxiii.^32939
(I Apr. 1858); xxxiv. 34782 (31July1859).
29 Zayonchkovsky, Voyennye reformy, p. 49; id., 'Milyutin: biograf. ocherk', p. 19.
30 Kersnovsky, Istoriya, ii. 398.^31 Danilov, in SVM i. app. pp. 70-183.
32 [Milyutinl 'Voyennye reformy', pp. 21-35; for a full analysis, see Miller, Miliutin, pp. 34-66,
79-87; Jones, 'Administrative System' in MNERSU ii (1980), 108-17.