among the Hindu population, would change in favor of the Zionists. He
therefore urged the Zionist leadership to make up for their prolonged
neglect of India.^30 In the wake of its interactions with various Indian
leaders during and after the conference, the Jewish delegation off ered a
number of suggestions to the Jewish Agency for Palestine:^31 to establish
a Jewish Palestine unit of the Asian Relations Or ga ni za tion, to send a
permanent po liti cal representative of the Jewish Agency to India, to cre-
ate a desk for India and Asia at the Po liti cal Department of the Jewish
Agency, to induce the Palestinian press to act as stringers for the Indian
press, to explore the possibility of establishing an economic- liaison offi ce
in Bombay, to consider establishing a chair for Judaism at the University
of Banaras (that is, Banaras Hindu University), and to use pro- Indian
U.S. politicians “who are at the same time pro- Zionists... for our cause.”
As one delegate lamented, India “is a great chance that has been ne-
glected far too long.”
Some of these suggestions eventually materialized, and an aliya offi ce
was opened in Bombay shortly after India’s recognition. The Israeli unit of
the Asian Relations Or ga ni za tion functioned until June 1955, when the
Bandung Conference formally ended the parent or ga ni za tion.^32 While
some in the yishuv were happy over their participation, others were con-
cerned over Nehru’s remarks about the Arab character of Palestine and
felt the need to do more “to bring home to Asiatic people the realities of
Palestine— that the Holy Land is inseparable from the people of Israel.”^33
The overall eff ects of the Asian Relations Conference, however, were
negative. The New Delhi meeting was the fi rst and last occasion when a
delegation from the yishuv/Israel was invited to such a po liti cal gather-
ing. Despite its stated objective of seeking interstate cooperation by avoid-
ing controversial issues, the conference could not avoid heated argu-
ments over the Palestine question. Even the nearly total absence of Arab
countries did not prevent Jewish- Arab discord from coming into the
open. Tension between the two sides set the stage for future acts. Berg-
mann’s declaration against “dispossessing population” was not vindi-
cated by subsequent events surrounding the Arab- Israeli war of 1948.
Jewish- Israeli exclusivism in Palestine ran counter to Nehru’s vision of
a partitioned but genuinely multiracial, multireligious, and multicul-
tural India. Summing up the outcome, one Indian academic observed:
“even as the Jewish spokesman made the solemn declaration before the
Conference, the Zionist movement irrevocably committed itself to an
exclusive Jewish State, snuffi ng out all hopes of genuine multi- racial,
nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964 187