multi- religious and multi- cultural co- existence and cooperation in Pales-
tine. The Zionists [therefore] were excluded from all subsequent Asian
conferences.”^34 Thus the Asian Relations Conference, though important,
did not result in mutual appreciation of each others’ concerns and anxieties.
India failed to appreciate the underlying causes for the particularistic
Jewish nationalism. For its part, the yishuv/Israeli leadership failed to
alleviate New Delhi’s concerns over imperialism. These diff erences in-
fl uenced India’s subsequent stand at the United Nations, especially over
Israel’s membership.
UN Membership
From the beginning Israel was keen to join the United Nations,
especially as its creation was recommended by that world body. In March
1949, the rival cold- war blocs both endorsed its request for membership.
The Soviet Union, which opposed Jordan’s membership, was favorably
inclined toward the Israeli request. At the same time, the world body ex-
pressed concerns over Israel’s policies toward sensitive issues such as
Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, the assassination of UN mediator Count
Bernadotte, and Israel’s ability and willingness to shoulder and live up to
its international commitments. For Israel, membership thus was of criti-
cal importance. Major powers including the United States and the Soviet
Union had already granted recognition. UN admission, it hoped, would
signal international disapproval of the Arab refusal to come to terms with
its existence and a rejection of their eff orts to isolate and strangle the
newly formed state.
What was India’s response? Keeping with its “consistent” attitude on
the entire question, New Delhi voted against the Israeli request. On May
11, 1949, with a margin of thirty- seven votes to twelve, with nine absten-
tions, the United Nations admitted Israel as a member. According to
Nehru’s biographer S. Gopal, India was originally planning to abstain but
then reversed its position and voted against Israeli admission.^35 Speaking
on the occasion, India’s ambassador in New York, M. C. Setalvad, argued
that his country “could not recognize a state which had been achieved
through the use of force and not through negotiations.”^36
Not everyone was happy with Nehru’s decision, and there were voices
of dissent within the Indian establishment. Shiva Rao, who was active
during the Asian Relations Conference of 1947, was one. In 1949, he was
188 nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964