Minister M. C. Chagla outlined the Indian position,^12 which had fi ve im-
portant aspects. Each requires a close look.
- The creation of Israel had given rise to tension between Israel and the
Arab countries. In a somewhat similar fashion in 1958, Prime Minister
Nehru told the Lok Sabha: “Ever since Israel came into existence, it has
been a source of constant irritation to the Arab countries.”^13 While Nehru’s
observation went unnoticed, Chagla’s pronouncement sparked an acri-
monious debate in parliament. - The sovereign right of Egypt to demand the withdrawal of the UNEF
could not be questioned. This was in accordance with the Indian position
since the formation of the UN peacekeeping force in November 1956.^14 In
hindsight, it is clear that this move precipitated a full- fl edged war. - India appreciated the reasons that compelled President Nasser to de-
mand the withdrawal of the UNEF from Egyptian soil. This was in agree-
ment with its general policy of supporting the Arab countries, especially
in their confl ict with Israel. - The Gulf of Aqaba was part of the territorial waters of Egypt, and India
appreciated their closure to Israeli shipping. As discussed earlier, geo graph-
i cal fact does not support the Indian position. Hence, Nasser’s action of
closing the Gulf of Tiran in the Red Sea to Israeli shipping could only be
interpreted as an act of belligerency. - India foresaw a threat of aggression from Israel. New Delhi anticipated
Israeli aggression more than ten days before the commencement of the
actual hostilities. Strangely, the government came to this assessment
without a resident mission or even an Indian journalist being present in
Israel. In the absence of fi rst- hand information, let alone assessment, the
government would have relied on reports fi led by its missions in the Arab
countries. In short, India was in no position to make an in de pen dent as-
sessment of the unfolding drama in the Middle East.
According to Chagla, this controversial statement “was drafted by my
Ministry [of External Aff airs and] was fi nalized and approved by the
Po liti cal Aff airs Committee of the Cabinet.”^15 Despite repeated pleas from
the opposition, the government refused to modify its May 25 position.^16
Thus India approached the June war with this set of preconceived ideas
and subsequently hardened its position as events unfolded.
Its stance on the Israeli off ensive was unequivocal. Rejecting the op-
position’s suggestion for caution, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared:
the years of hardened hostility, 1964–1984 205