246 n ormalization and aftera zero- sum game. Support for the Palestinians, it felt, demanded not only
unfriendliness toward Israel but also opposition to normal diplomatic
interaction. By denying formal relations with Israel, it sought to project
its pro- Arab credentials. Its preoccupation with Pakistan’s diplomatic
moves in the Middle East and domestic concerns over Muslim senti-
ments prevented its leaders from diff erentiating between bilateral issues
and multilateral concerns. Just as Pakistan clouded India’s overall foreign-
policy formulations during the cold war, it also forced India to see rela-
tions with Israel within an “either/or” paradigm.
Normalization was a paradigm shift. India recognized and admitted
that it was possible to establish normal relations with Israel without
abandoning its support for the Palestinians. This approach toward the
Arab- Israeli confl ict was a new experience for India. Major powers have
recognized the need to maintain normal ties with all parties involved in
the confl ict, and even if they are not prepared to mediate, relations with
Israel have become a precondition for international credibility.^30 Con-
tinuing past hostility and absence of formal ties with Israel only meant
marginalization in the Middle East. Even before the fall of the Berlin
Wall, eastern Eu ro pe an countries and China initiated low- level contacts
with Israel and were giving suffi cient indications of normalization. While
the cold war was not responsible for the Arab- Israeli confl ict, it defi nitely
intensifi ed the problem and contributed to Israel’s po liti cal isolation.
Contrary to some critics, normalization did not mean that India had
abandoned or betrayed the Palestinians. Nor was it a surrender to impe-
rialism.^31 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s decision did not dilute India’s
position on the right of self- determination of the Palestinians or the sup-
port for Palestinian statehood. Nor was normalization an endorsement of
Israeli claims vis-à- vis Palestinian po liti cal rights. Rao was merely stat-
ing that support for Palestinians did not mean isolating Israel. Some of
India’s earlier actions (for example, the Zionism resolution of 1975) and
studied silence over extremist Arab rhetoric might incorrectly suggest
that New Delhi shared the Arab desire for the destruction of Israel.
Though this was never touted, India always opposed the extremist de-
mands among the Arabs and Palestinians regarding Israel. This was part
of Nehru’s legacy. In 1947, he opposed the unitary plan proposed by the
Arabs and suggested a federal alternative. When this idea did not get any
attention at the United Nations, he did not support the unitary solution.
Likewise, the reluctance to establish diplomatic relations with Israel did
not mean that India endorsed Arab calls for the destruction of the Jewish