normalization and after 247state. Its refusals to normalize were often accompanied by its willingness
to accept Israel’s existence.
During the cold war, a negotiated settlement was remote, partly be-
cause of the infamous “Three Nos” of the September 1967 Arab summit
in Khartoum.^32 India felt that given the prevailing international climate,
its pro- Arab policy demanded absence of formal ties with the Jewish
state. In the post– cold war and post- Madrid era, isolating Israel became
unwise and counterproductive. When the Arab states were eager to nego-
tiate with Israel, even a pro- Palestinian policy would require India to sup-
port the Madrid pro cess. The most tangible means of doing this was to
have relations with all parties to the confl ict, including Israel.
This interpretation of the normalization of ties is supported by events
since 1992. First and foremost, India presented relations with Israel as a
contributing factor to the peace pro cess. Active engagement with other na-
tions bestowed greater self- confi dence to Israel and increased its trust. Both
were essential if Israel was to overcome its inherent security concerns vis-
à- vis a Palestinian state. Even if India’s actual contribution to the peace
pro cess was limited, Rao was prepared to be a part of the international en-
deavor aimed at minimizing Israel’s mistrust of the outside world.^33
Normalization was not accompanied by any radical departure from
past positions vis-à- vis the Palestinian question. India is still committed
to the establishment of a Palestinian state and views the fulfi llment of
the Palestinian po liti cal aspirations as a precondition for lasting peace in
the Middle East. It continues to recognize the PLO as the sole and legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinians and recognizes the legality and
powers of the Palestine National Authority. It has treated the Palestinian
mission in New Delhi as a full- fl edged embassy since March 1980. Fol-
lowing its recognition of the state of Palestine in November 1988, New
Delhi received Yasser Arafat and later Mahmoud Abbas as heads of state.
In the initial years, it had coordinated critical diplomatic moves on Israel
with Chairman Arafat. While the nuances have undergone changes,
India’s basic postures on some of the key issues have not been diluted.
While it has abandoned its tendency to sermonize and employ anti- Israeli
rhetoric, it has not switched sides. Much to Israel’s annoyance and dis-
plea sure, it continues to support the Arab stance regarding the Palestine
question in various forums, such as the United Nations and the NAM.
On issues such as Jewish settlements, borders, status of Jerusalem, and
refugees, there is no major diff erence between India’s pre- 1992 and post-
normalization positions.