normalization and after 251At least until the late 1990s, India appeared to be bending over backward
in preventing its new relations with Israel from aff ecting its ties with
Arab countries.
A noticeable shift was visible toward the end of the 1990s, especially
following the formation of the BJP- led NDA government under Atal Be-
hari Vajpayee. Either out of growing Indian confi dence or due to the his-
toric pro- Israeli baggage of the BJP, the Indian leaders were more willing
to publicize the friendship with Israel. This was also the time when India
adopted a softer line toward various developments concerning the peace
pro cess. The onset of the al- Aqsa intifada and the subsequent intensifi ca-
tion of international criticism over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians
did not hamper India from seeking closer ties with Jewish state.
Bilateral relations im mensely benefi ted from the Indian provincial
governments. Even in the early 1990s, the state governments were free
from the po liti cal compulsions that inhibited the central government
from pursuing active relations with Israel. Enjoying the new openness
and opportunities off ered by economic liberalization, various state gov-
ernments directly dealt with foreign countries to promote their economic
agendas. From the very beginning, INC- ruled states such as Haryana,
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Punjab were in the
forefront of forging strong ties with Israel. Without attracting undue
publicity, their chief ministers visited the Jewish state and sought coop-
eration in agriculture, water management, and foreign investment.^43 Even
if the actual progress was moderate, state governments entered into nu-
merous agreements and understandings with various Israeli companies
and organizations. Indeed, the participation of state governments in pro-
moting Indo- Israeli relations has rarely been appreciated. For their part,
Israeli leaders and businesspersons found it easier to deal with the state
governments, whose primary agenda was economic, especially when the
central leadership was preoccupied with po liti cal correctness.
Some of the non- INC opposition parties were helpful in Rao’s over-
tures to Israel. As they had been since the days of the Constituent Assem-
bly, the socialists were in the forefront of seeking closer ties with Israel.
When the Congress Party remained aloof and was busy with anti- Israeli
rhetoric, it was the opposition parties, especially the Jan Sangh, the Praja
Socialist Party, and the Swatantra Party that campaigned for moderation
and modifi cation. Following normalization, these groups and leaders
were quick to embrace the opening provided by Rao. These developments
led to the emergence of a national consensus and, until the outbreak of