250 n ormalization and afterPo liti cal Contacts
There are growing po liti cal interactions between the two coun-
tries, and hosts of offi cial, semioffi cial, and unoffi cial visits have taken
place since 1992. There exists a genuine domestic consensus regard-
ing Israel, especially regarding normalization. Po liti cal opposition to
some of Israel’s policies vis-à- vis the Palestinians did not impede Indian
leaders from recognizing the benefi ts of normalization. Issues like agri-
cultural cooperation, technology transfer, foreign investments, tourism,
and military- strategic cooperation generated positive sentiments about
Israel. Those who entertained reservations over Rao’s decision gradually
muted their opposition and came to terms with the need to benefi t from
Israel rather than continuing with past anti- Israeli rhetoric.
India avoided a high- profi le approach toward Israel and thus its po liti-
cal dealings with Israel have been somewhat asymmetrical. While Israeli
leaders were eager to visit New Delhi, the latter adopted a cautious and at
times even cool approach toward such requests. There were signs that
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin wanted to visit India as part of his Far East
trip in late 1993. Prime Minister Rao was reluctant even when the Israeli
leader was hosted by Islamic countries like Indonesia.^39 Likewise, during
the visit of President Ezer Weizmann in late 1996, it was agreed that his
Indian counterpart would make a reciprocal visit to Israel. A de cade later,
this has not materialized.^40 Likewise, prolonged persuasion from the In-
dian military establishment preceded the po liti cal leadership agreeing to
post a defense attaché in Israel.^41
For a while, India sought to “balance” its contacts with Israel by mak-
ing similar gestures toward the Arabs. Days before announcing the
normalization of relations with Israel, for example, Prime Minister Rao
hosted Arafat and appeared anxious to secure his approval before moving
closer to Israel. During Rao’s tenure, India’s high- profi le contacts with
Israel were either preceded or followed by similar contacts with the Pales-
tinian leadership. As long as Arafat was alive, even the BJP followed this
trend, albeit with less frequency.^42 The opening of the Maulana Abul
Kalam Center in Cairo in 1992 and the awarding of the Jawaharlal Nehru
Prize for International Understanding to President Hosni Mubarak in
1997 were aimed at mitigating some of Egyptian concerns over normal-
ization. The general reluctance of Indian ministers to visit Israel has to
be seen within the context of “Arab sensitivities.” For the same reason,
Indian leaders have long denied any defense procurements from Israel.