normalization and after 259not last long, with both nations settling for reconciliation, accommoda-
tion, and a commitment to forge closer ties.^60 Just as the United States has
learned to abandon its prolonged nonproliferation policy toward India, the
latter has learned to abandon its erstwhile anti- American rhetoric, which
peaked during the early 1980s. The July 2005 nuclear agreement not only
signaled a new phase of Indo- U.S. relations but also compelled other
countries of the world to look to India as a potential partner. In short, im-
provement in its relations with the United States has opened many doors
to India.
It is essential to recognize that the qualitative improvements in Indo-
U.S. relations especially since 1998 did not come because of the normal-
ization of relations with Israel. This happened primarily because of
India’s economic growth and its willingness to adopt a market- friendly
economic liberalization program. Had it remained a Soviet- modeled
closed economy with limited economic opportunities, greater state inter-
vention, and an anti- American ideology, friends of Israel would not have
brought about any Indo- U.S. rapprochement. It was the fundamental
transformation in India’s worldview and its growing economic clout, not
normalization, that led to the warming of relations with the United States.
While one does not rule out the positive role played by the American
friends of Israel, the core reason for improvement in Indo- U.S. relations
has to be found in changes that occurred inside India since 1991 and its
post– cold war worldview.
For its part, India has been extremely wary of the U.S. role in disturb-
ing closer ties with Israel, especially in the military- security arena. In the
past, U.S. dis plea sure and disapproval resulted in Israel abandoning or
scaling down its military exports to countries with which the United
States had problems. The shift in U.S. policy, for example, compelled
Israel to abandon the lucrative South African market during the dying
stages of apartheid. This interventionist policy forced Israel to abandon
military exports to China, including the Phalcon early warning system.^61
India sought to avoid the same trap.^62 It did not wish to fi nd itself in the
situation China found itself in, where military ties with Israel would be
subjected to American whims. New Delhi decided to synchronize its Is-
rael policy with Washington. By keeping the United States on board and
in the picture, it hopes to minimize U.S. intervention. It is in this context
that one has to examine some of the statements made by Indian leaders,
especially when the NDA was in power. For example, addressing a dinner
hosted by the American Jewish Committee in May 2003, Brajesh Mishra,