260 n ormalization and afterIndia’s national- security adviser, observed that these three countries
“have some fundamental similarities. We are all democracies, sharing a
common vision of pluralism, tolerance, and equal opportunity. Stronger
India- U.S. relations and India- Israel relations have a natural logic.”^63 By
bringing the United States into its bilateral relations with Israel, New
Delhi sought to quarantine a potential American veto.
The reaction of the Middle Eastern countries is interesting. Compared
to domestic criticisms, their reactions to normalization were muted al-
most to the point of indiff erence. Major powers who had a stake in the
Madrid peace pro cess were favorably disposed toward normalization. By
accepting Israel and ending its diplomatic isolation, they hoped to con-
tribute to peace in the Middle East. A more confi dent Israel, they felt,
would be more willing to make po liti cal concessions that were essential
for the success of the peace negotiations. For their part, the Arab coun-
tries were equally reconciled to the prospect of other countries modify-
ing their policy toward the Jewish state. Having abandoned the “three
Nos” of Khartoum, they could not counsel other states against talking to
Israel, especially when these countries lack any bilateral disputes with
Israel. The willingness of hardliner states such as Syria to go to Madrid
meant that constructive engagement and not po liti cal isolation was the
order the day.
There were some exceptions. Still reeling under the infl uence of the
Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran was not ready to embrace the idea of Indo-
Israeli normalization. Since its early days, hostility toward the Jewish
state has been a cornerstone of the Islamic revolution. At the same time,
post- Khomeini Iran was gradually seeking to end its po liti cal isolation
both within and outside the Middle East. Hence, beyond minor criticism
in the initial stages, Iran did not allow Indo- Israeli relations to impede its
desire to seek closer ties with New Delhi. One could go to the extent of
suggesting that while Israel was preoccupied with Indo- Iranian rela-
tions, Tehran was almost indiff erent toward Indo- Israeli ties, including
the growing military relationship.^64
This is not true for Egypt. New Delhi initially feared that its new over-
tures toward Israel might generate negative vibes in the region, espe-
cially from Egypt. The same month it declared normalization, India
announced the establishment of a cultural center in Cairo named after
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. This, India hoped, would assuage Egyptian
sensitivities and thereby convey a strong message to the larger Arab world
that its decision to establish relations with Israel was not anti- Arab. A few