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Directly or indirectly, Iran has been interfering in these areas or
influencing their Shia population. This, in turn, contributed to the sectar-
ian tension in the region, with Iran and Saudi Arabia seeking to champion
the interests and causes of the Shia and Sunni populations, respectively.
The Saudi-Iranian tension and rivalry are responsible for the continuation
of the civil wars in Syria and Yemen and other tensions in the region, espe-
cially in Bahrain and Iraq.
India seeks close relations with all the countries along the Persian Gulf.
They meet a large chunk of India’s hydrocarbon needs and in the process
make the region India’s largest trading partner. Iran has a strategic role to
play in India’s relations with Central Asia, Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.
The Gulf Arab states have an equally substantial part in the form of labour
migration, remittances and investment opportunities. Thus, India seeks
closer ties with the Arab and non-Arab countries along the Gulf.
The domestic dimension of the sectarian politics in the Gulf should not
be underestimated let alone ignored. If India has the second largest
Muslim population after Indonesia, it also has the third largest Shia popu-
lation after Iran. Siding with one or the other parties in the sectarian divide
in the Gulf would have unexpected cascading effect upon the Muslims of
the country. With the periodic rise of communal tensions in different parts
of the country, sectarian stress over the Persian Gulf is the last thing India
needs. Hence, a regular appreciation and evaluation of the sectarian genie
in the Middle East without involvement would be the golden middle path
for India.
This in practical terms would mean India coming to terms with the
Saudi apprehensions of the Iranian hegemony not only in the Gulf but
also beyond. With its core attributes of regional power—territory, popu-
lation and natural resources—Iran has the political will and desire for
regional domination. Indeed, the Islamic republic is the only country in
the entire Middle East which seeks and wields influence far beyond its
immediate borders and from Syria in the North to Yemen in the South it
influences many regional developments. Apprehensions over this largely
contribute to a more aggressive policy on the part of Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, the internal tensions within the GCC are partly due to differ-
ences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over latter’s approach towards
Iran. While siding with Riyadh is not an option, New Delhi will have to
understand, and if possible appreciate, the Saudi fears over possible
Iranian hegemony in the Gulf.
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR