219Second, India’s forays into the Gulf, especially since the ascendance of
Narendra Modi, come at less advantageous times. Since 1945 the US has
functioned as a Gulf power, often by forging closer ties with Iran, Saudi
or with both. Much of the post–Second World War events in the Persian
Gulf were designed, delivered or shaped by Washington. If Britain and
France played second fiddle, the USSR and later on Russia had a marginal
role in the Gulf. The Bush administration’s responses to the September
11 terror attacks in the form of ill-planned and costly wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq dented the American power and contributed to continuous slid-
ing of its influence in the Middle East. Indeed, since 2003 the US had
limited influence on a host of regional developments, including the never-
ending Arab-Israeli conflict. Even the political deal over the Iranian
nuclear controversy has been primarily due to the American recognition
of its dwindling regional influence and its inability to pursue costlier mili-
tary option or prolonged economic sanctions against Iran. Indeed, a
quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, the US has succeeded
in alienating its friends and enemies alike; if the former felt let down, the
latter are emboldened.
This weakening American influence, especially in the Persian Gulf,
coincided with India’s more active engagements. Within four years after
assuming office, Prime Minister Modi, for example, visited all the major
Gulf countries and signalled his desire to engage with them economically.
Moving away from erstwhile hesitation, he has shown a willingness to
cooperate with Saudi Arabia and others in a host of security issues such as
joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, potential arms exports, coun-
terterrorism, sea piracy, money laundering, terror financing, organized
crimes as well as religious extremism. India would have to pursue them
without piggybacking on the US. Furthermore, India would have to
enhance its engagements with Saudi Arabia while facing competition from
three sources; the traditional rival Pakistan has been joined by Russia and
China whose economic clout vis-à-vis Riyadh far exceeds India’s.
Third, the delinking of the Pakistan factor was the real catalyst in the
transformation of India’s Saudi policy. This approach not only enabled
India to look at the real potentials of the bilateral relations but also resulted
in Riyadh taking a more sanguine attitude towards India and its potentials.
Not having to choose between an Islamic Pakistan and more powerful
India, the Kingdom began responding to the latter’s needs and priorities.
Granting of over flight facilities for Indian flights to Israel, for example,
CHALLENGES