RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort
to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the sen-
ior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in
the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council, as envi-
sioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership
should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned
to the continental United States in order to “reset” the force and restore the U.S. mil-
itary to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.
RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congress
should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over
the next five years.
RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the rele-
vant committees of Congress, should assess the full future budgetary impact of the war
in Iraq and its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the ability to
recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in
research and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved
in the stability and reconstruction effort.
- Police and Criminal Justice
The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are profound.
The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support the mission to “pro-
tect and serve” all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police do not embrace that mis-
sion, in part because of problems in how reforms were organized and implemented by
the Iraqi and U.S. governments.
Recommended Iraqi ActionsWithin Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent militia infiltration
is due, in part, to the poor organization of Iraq’s component police forces: the Iraqi
National Police, the Iraqi Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service.
The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more military than domestic
in nature—involving commando-style operations—and is thus ill-suited to the Min-
istry of the Interior. The more natural home for the National Police is within the Min-
istry of Defense, which should be the authority for counterinsurgency operations and
heavily armed forces. Though depriving the Ministry of the Interior of operational
forces, this move will place the Iraqi National Police under better and more rigorous
Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable these units to better perform their coun-
terinsurgency mission.
RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to
the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the
new Iraqi Army.
552 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS