Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that bears little resemblance
to ordinary policing, especially in light of the current flow of foreign fighters,
insurgents, and weaponry across Iraq’s borders and the need for joint patrols of the
border with foreign militaries. Thus the natural home for the Border Police is within
the Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority for controlling Iraq’s borders.
RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to
the Ministry of Defense, which would have total responsibility for border control and
external security.
The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and provides local policing,
needs to become a true police force. It needs legal authority, training, and equipment
to control crime and protect Iraqi citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not be easy,
and the presence of American advisors will be required to help the Iraqis determine a
new role for the police.
RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater respon-
sibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand its cooperation with other
elements in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime and protect Iraqi
civilians.
In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, the Ministry of the Inte-
rior needs to undertake substantial reforms to purge bad elements and highlight best prac-
tices. Once the ministry begins to function effectively, it can exert a positive influence over
the provinces and take back some of the authority that was lost to local governments
through decentralization. To reduce corruption and militia infiltration, the Ministry of the
Interior should take authority from the local governments for the handling of policing
funds. Doing so will improve accountability and organizational discipline, limit the author-
ity of provincial police officials, and identify police officers with the central government.
RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a pro-
cess of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand the capability and
reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) and to exert
more authority over local police forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and
disburse financial support to local police should be transferred to the Ministry of the
Interior.
Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection Service under
the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Simply disbanding these units is not
an option, as the members will take their weapons and become full-time militiamen
or insurgents. All should be brought under the authority of a reformed Ministry of
the Interior. They will need to be vetted, retrained, and closely supervised. Those who
are no longer part of the Facilities Protection Service need to participate in a disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration program (outlined above).
RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed
with current efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities Protection Service.
IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS 553