army against Philadelphia. Clinton was aghast
to learn that Howe pursued a personal war
against Washington while failing to support
the impending Canadian offensive by Gen.
John Burgoyne. Burgoyne’s success largely
depended on an offensive launched north
from New York City, and in October 1777 Clin-
ton scraped together his resources and suc-
cessfully attacked Forts Clinton and Mont-
gomery in the New York highlands. However,
the British war effort was staggered by word
of Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga, and the
British cabinet decided to shake up the high
command. Accordingly, Howe resigned in
May 1778 and was succeeded by Clinton. It re-
mained to be seen if this change of com-
mand—and temperaments—would halt the
decline of British fortunes in America.
Clinton took over Howe’s army at Philadel-
phia and decided he lacked the resources to
defend it against the French fleet. After a
failed attempt to trap the Marquis de
Lafayette at Barren Hill in May, he made
preparations to proceed overland back to
New York City. En route, the British were at-
tacked by an invigorated Washington at Mon-
mouth on June 28, 1778, and an inconclusive
battle was fought. Clinton then resumed his
march and took up defensive positions for
nearly two years. By this time France was of-
fering money and military support directly to
the Americans. Clinton, in contrast, became
saddled with Adm. Marriot Arbuthnot, a
stubborn, quarrelsome commander who did
his best to obstruct combined operations.
Worse yet was the elevation of Gen. Charles
Cornwallisto a senior command position.
The ambitious Cornwallis was a superb bat-
tlefield leader but lacked clear strategic
sense, and he hotly debated Clinton over how
to break the impasse. Clinton and Germain
originated the idea of commencing a gradual
conquest of the South, and in December 1779
he again attacked Charleston. This time the
British siege, conducted between February
and May, succeeded entirely, and Gen. Ben-
jamin Lincoln’s army of 5,400 men was cap-
tured. It was Clinton’s greatest triumph of the
war and a perilous strategic loss for the Amer-
icans. Continuing operations were then
handed off to Cornwallis and his force of
8,000 men.
Clinton retired to New York to await devel-
opments and keep a watch on the army of
George Washington, which was hovering
nearby. His remaining tenure there was unre-
markable beyond a series of destructive raids
committed by former Governor William
Tryon, as well as the defection of Gen. Bene-
dict Arnold. That coup, unfortunately, was
tempered by the arrest of Clinton’s trusted
aide, Maj. John Andre, who was subse-
quently executed as a spy.
Cornwallis initially enjoyed considerable
success and gave the British their longest
string of victories since the war started. How-
ever, he squandered his slender resources in a
series of futile campaigns against Gen.
Nathaniel Greene and was forced to retreat to
the coastal enclave of Yorktown, Virginia.
There he dug in and begged Clinton for rein-
forcements. Clinton initially balked, until he
learned that Washington had cleverly stolen a
march on him and was already pressing to-
ward Yorktown. Clinton then boarded 8,000
men on the fleet and sailed, but he arrived in
Chesapeake Bay eight daysafterCornwallis’s
surrender on October 24, 1781. The British
colonial government fell as a consequence,
and in May 1782 a new ministry appointed
Gen. Sir Guy Carletonto replace Clinton as
commander in chief. It had been a frustrating
four years.
Clinton returned to England dejected and
angered over being blamed for the loss of
America. But he refused to be scapegoated
and published memoirs to absolve himself
of the blame. Saddled by indifferent superi-
ors like Gage and Howe, unruly subordi-
nates like Cornwallis, and uncooperative al-
lies like Arbuthnot, he argued there was
nothing more that he could have done. Clin-
ton subsequently lost his Parliament seat in
1784 but regained it six years later. He also
continued in the military, eventually rising
to full general in 1793. The following year heCLINTON, HENRY