agreements and in what amounted to an act of war, Egypt sealed off
maritime access to the Israeli port of Eilat, effectively stopping Is-
rael’s sea trade with much of Africa and the Far East. Then, on 26
July 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser announced Egypt’s nationalization of
the Suez Canal, most of whose shares were held by Britain and
France. With diplomacy failing to reverse Nasser’s decision, Britain
and France embarked on preparations to regain control of the canal,
and on 29 October 1956, together with Israel, they launched a mili-
tary operation in the Sinai Peninsula. Four and a half months later, on
16 March 1957, Israel withdrew its troops from Sinai and the Gaza
Strip after receiving international assurances that its vital waterways
would remain open. Israeli forces were replaced by 3,300 United Na-
tions troops. Despite Israel’s withdrawal, the Egyptians refused to
open the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping.
Israel’s Military Intelligence(MI) had a key role in planning the
Sinai Campaign. In an agreement between the French and Israeli
governments on a “joint venture,” MI was represented by its director,
Major General Yehoshafat Harkabi. The preparations for the mili-
tary campaign led to fruitful relations between the French and Israeli
intelligence communities, one of the side effects of the Sinai Cam-
paign. Before the campaign, the MI stance was to favor war against
Egypt as a preventive or at least delaying measure against the forth-
coming adoption by Egypt of modern Soviet weapons through a
transaction known as the “Czechoslovak agreement.” MI assessed
that a strike against Egypt, together with the French and the British
armies, would result in quiet along the Israel border with that coun-
try; in the mid-1950s Israel suffered greatly from infiltration of fe-
dayeenterrorists. MI even surmised that the war might lead to the
toppling of Nasser’s regime.
In the summer and fall of 1956, MI was required to plan its part in
the war. All MI sections participated: the collection, research, com-
bat, and field security departments. MI was required to plan a cam-
paign that would mislead Egypt into believing that Israel’s planned
war target was not Egypt but Jordan. This impression was to be cre-
ated through the war preparations that were hard to conceal. In the
last week of October 1956, MI planted information in the Israeli
press that the Iraqi army had entered Jordan. It was assumed world-
wide that Israel considered the reinforcement of the Jordanian side of262 • SINAI CAMPAIGN06-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 262