the border by the Iraqi Army to be a casus belli. Countries as a whole
across the world, like many Israelis who read newspaper headlines,
were convinced that a war against Jordan was in the making. This de-
ception succeeded better than the rosiest anticipation. Even in the Is-
rael Defense Forces, the mobilization of the reserves was explained
as preparation for war against Jordan.
On 29 October President Dwight D. Eisenhower conveyed to Israel
a message stating that, based on U.S. intelligence, the Iraqi army had
not entered Jordan. Although in Israel it was considered necessary to
conceal the real war target even from the U.S. president, Prime Min-
ister David Ben-Gurion in his reply underlined aggressive Egyptian
trends. By and large, the deception held until the very moment of the
drop of the first Israeli paratroopers into the Mitla Pass in the Sinai
Desert on the evening of 20 October 1956.
On the eve of the Sinai Campaign the Israel Air Force (IAF) was
tasked to perform two missions related to intelligence. One was to
disrupt Egyptian army communications by severing telephone and
telegraph lines by means of low-flying aircraft. This daring action
made it hard for Egyptian headquarters to maintain command and
control of its army units; it also contributed to eavesdropping on
transmissions of conversations among Egyptian commanders. In ad-
dition, before the launching of the war, the IAF supported imagery in-
telligence (IMINT) by photographing the prospective theater. Due to
this photography, the paratroopers’ drop site was changed. Originally
it had been planned for the western entrance to the Mitla Pass, but
photographs taken on 6 October revealed the presence of 16 small
huts there, and on the very eve of the drop, air reconnaissance re-
vealed 26 tents and several vehicles. The significance of these dis-
coveries aroused debate in the MI Egyptian desk: was a substantial
Egyptian military force in place there, or were they merely civilians?
To avoid unnecessary risk, the decision was made to drop one para-
troop battalion near the eastern entrance to the Mitla Pass.
MI research fulfilled its task in assessing that an Egyptian decla-
ration of an intention to send reinforcements to Sharm al-Sheikh
was without foundation, so the Israeli decision to dispatch Brigade
6 there remained as planned. MI research also correctly estimated
that the aftermath of victory in the Sinai Campaign would be quiet
along the Israeli-Egyptian border. Finally, the manner in which MISINAI CAMPAIGN• 26306-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 263