On the morning of 23 May, the Israeli cabinet held a briefing with
the participation of the director of MI, Major General Aharon Yariv,
and concluded that with the closure of the Strait of Tiran it was now
merely a question of time until a military response was made. If Israel
did not respond, its credibility—and the IDF’s deterrent power—would
be worthless; the Arab countries might interpret Israeli inaction as
weakness, and an opportunity to assail its security and very existence.
Yariv recommended an immediate military response. Lieutenant Gen-
eral Rabin and the commander of the IAF, Major General Mordechai
Hod, recommended that Israel take the initiative and make the first
strike. But Prime Minister Eshkol preferred to continue along the
diplomatic path, hoping that Western powers would resolve the issue.
On 30 May Jordan’s King Hussein flew to Cairo. This move was a
genuine surprise. MI was well aware of the deep animosity between
Nasser and Hussein in the past. Nevertheless, on this visit, the two
leaders concluded a mutual defense pact and announced that Jordan
would form a joint military command with Egypt under an Egyptian
general on the Jordanian front.
On 2 June the Israeli cabinet decided in principle to launch a pre-
emptive war. The military realized the dangers of waiting any longer:
more Egyptian troops would arrive from Yemen, and the Soviet Union
would continue supplying weapons to Egypt. Moreover, it was under-
stood that the United Nations and Washington would do nothing to
break Nasser’s blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. MI was aware of the
inadequacy of Egypt’s preparations and its army’s weak morale. Yariv
asserted that the Egyptians were still busy pushing units across the
canal and were in such haste that some of their troops had been left
without food and water for two days running. Some of them arrived at
the front in traditional Arab peasant dress, as there had not been time
to issue them with uniforms.
Amit visited his counterparts at the Central Intelligence Agency in
Washington, D.C., for consultations and was able to infer that the
United States would more than understand an Israeli first strike. On
4 June the Israeli cabinet resolved to start the war on the following
morning. Accordingly, on 5 June the IAF struck the Arab military air-
fields and destroyed 304 out of the 419 Egyptian aircraft on the
ground, 53 out of 112 Syrian planes, and Jordan’s entire 28-plane air
force. The IAF even reached Iraq’s westernmost air base at Hab-
baniya, destroying 10 planes on the ground. The main attack of theSIX-DAY WAR • 26706-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 267