IAF was against the Egyptian air bases and was launched in two
waves. The Israeli aircraft flew out over the Mediterranean and then
southeast to attack the Sinai bases. At 12:15 P.M. on 5 June Israel at-
tacked the Syrian and Jordanian air forces, putting them largely out
of action. With the Arab air forces out of the way, Israeli ground
forces moved into the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem, and the West
Bank, and overran all this territory within three days. On the sixth
day of the war, the IDF took the Golan Heights as well, putting north-
ern Galilee out of range of the Syrian guns.
Israel’s impressive victory in the Six-Day War was the result of ex-
cellent intelligence obtained mainly as human intelligence (HUMINT)
and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The HUMINT was obtained mainly
by Shaaltiel Ben-Yair, one of the most daring Israeli agents in Egypt.
Ben-Yair provided invaluable details about the Egyptian military bases
and other sensitive installations. Yosef (Joe) Ra’anan and Wolfgang
Lotzhad penetrated the highest levels of the Egyptian military and po-
litical establishments to obtain vital information on Egypt’s defense
and contingency plans. Sylvia Raphaelhad done a good espionage job
in obtaining intelligence information in Egypt before and during the
Six-Day War. Eli Cohenhad achieved the same in Syria and conveyed
countless details about the front line of Syrian fortifications on the
Golan Heights. There were many more like them, who still remain
anonymous. In addition, before the Six-Day War, the Mossad activated
in Egypt several non-Jewish Europeans and Americans. Two of them
were Italians and one was a Dutchman. They were caught by the Egyp-
tians and became double agents. Ali al-Alfi, masseur to both Nasser
and his successor Sadat, may have spied for Israel. He was accused by
the Egyptians of doing so and was sentenced to 15 years’imprisonment
in 1979.
The role of the SIGINT in obtaining information on the Arab coun-
tries and armies was no less important. Its most valuable information
was obtained by monitoring and recording on the morning of 6 June
a radiotelephone conversation between Nasser and King Hussein.
The conversation took place over the public telephone system and
was tapped by two veteran MI officers using vintage World War II
equipment. By that time most of Nasser’s air force had been elimi-
nated, but he did not share that information with Hussein. Still, it was
clear from the conversation that Hussein knew as well as Nasser that268 • SIX-DAY WAR06-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 268