hostages in the terminal were released alive, except for one who was
killed when he leaped at the Israeli forces. Another hostage, 75-year-
old Dora Bloch, who was recovering from a choking episode in a
Kampala hospital on the night of the raid, was left in Uganda and was
later murdered by two Ugandan army officers. Ugandan forces
opened fire on the Israeli troops, killing Lieutenant Colonel
Yehonathan Netanyahu. Forty-five Ugandan soldiers were killed dur-
ing the raid; Ugandan fighter planes parked on the ramp were also put
out of action. Shortly after the fighting ended, the rescued hostages
were flown out via Nairobi to Israel.
One of the factors behind the good planning of the raid was excel-
lent intelligence. The success of the Yehonathan Operation was due
to the first-class troops of Sayeret Matkal, but also, and no less im-
portant, to the essential information obtained by Israeli intelligence.
The Mossad’s Kenyan connection was vital as well for setting up a
forward base. For Israeli intelligence, the successful rescue from En-
tebbe airport a little less than three years after the failure to provide
an early warning on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur Warafforded
a major boost to morale. See alsoMACKENZIE, BRUCE.YOM KIPPUR WAR.The launching of the Yom Kippur War in Octo-
ber 1973 took Israel wholly by surprise and placed the country’s se-
curity—and even its survival—in jeopardy. True, by the war’s end the
Israeli army had turned the tables and both Cairo and Damascus were
under military threat, but this in no way diminished the shock that still
stunned the nation in the aftermath of the fighting. How could such a
disaster have happened? Israel was thought to be more or less “invin-
cible” in the minds of many of its military and political leaders. That
self-confidence rapidly dissipated as a consequence of the war. Much
of the blame fell on the shoulders of the intelligence community,
which was charged with not accurately assessing distinct information
that Egypt and Syria planned to go to war on 6 October 1973.Aftermath of the Six-Day War and War of Attrition.Israel’s victory
in the 1967 Six-Day Warhad extended its control across all the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. Is-
rael set up electronic eavesdropping and early warning stations on the
frontier with Jordan along the Jordan River Valley, on the frontier
with Syria on Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights, and on the fron-320 • YOM KIPPUR WAR06-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 320