tier with Egypt along the east bank of the Suez Canal, from which
Egyptian forces on the other side could be observed.
By 1969 the Israel Air Force (IAF) was using drones to photograph
and monitor Egyptian, Syrian, and later Jordanian troops. In July that
year the IAF was called on to engage in deep penetration bombing in
the Nile Valley in response to Egypt’s persistence in its declared War
of Attritionagainst Israel. In response to the Israeli raids, Egypt’s
president Gamal Abdel Nasser asked the Soviet Union for help in de-
fending Egyptian airspace. The Soviet response was rapid, and bat-
teries of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), including the latest SAM-3s,
with Soviet crews and squadrons of MiG-21 fighter jets with Soviet
pilots and ground crews were dispatched. The Soviets used their
MiGs to cover the Egyptian troops along the Suez Canal; they also
moved their SAM batteries as close to the Israeli positions as possi-
ble. At first, the IAF refrained from engaging the Soviet-piloted
MiGs. This changed in July 1970, when in a dogfight over Suez
Canal the IAF shot down four or five Soviet MiGs.
With the Soviets deeply involved in the defense of Egypt—almost
to the point of a direct military clash with Israel—the United States
became concerned about a strategic conflagration; American diplo-
mats negotiated a cease-fire, known as the Rogers Initiative, which
went into effect on 7 August 1970. One of its elements was a freeze
on Egyptian and Israeli redeployments as of that day. However, Egypt
breached this part of the agreement the very next day, moving its So-
viet antiaircraft batteries closer to the banks of the Suez Canal. The
Soviet Union and Egypt gambled that Israel would not respond so
soon after the cease-fire had gone into effect—and they were proved
right: Israel did nothing. This decision not to act was to have a telling
effect three years later, when Egyptian antiaircraft batteries along the
Suez Canal pounded the IAF in the first days of the Yom Kippur War.Intelligence Failures before the War.By mid-1973 Military Intelli-
gence(MI) was very much aware of the Arab war plans. Regarding
Egyptian strategy, MI had received information that the Egyptian
Second and Third armies would attempt to cross the Suez Canal and
penetrate about 6 miles (10 kilometers) into the Israeli-held Sinai.
Following the infantry assault, Egyptian armored divisions would
then cross the Suez Canal and advance as far as the Mitla and Gidi
passes—strategic crossing points for any army in the Sinai Peninsula.YOM KIPPUR WAR• 32106-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 321