only 10 people knew of the impending assault on Israel; they in-
cluded President Assad, his minister of war and commander-in-chief,
the director of operations, the Syrian DMI, the commander of the air
force, and the commander of the antiaircraft defense networks.
Egyptian corps and division commanders, and the equivalent general
staff officers, were told of the war on 1 October at a meeting of the
Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Their Syrian coun-
terparts learned of the war the day it was to start at a similar meeting
in Damascus. Brigade and battalion commanders in both armies
learned of the imminent offensive only on 5 October or the following
morning, the actual day of the attack. The vast majority of Egyptian
and Syrian officers and troops learned that they were going into bat-
tle only an hour or two before the assault. Because Egypt and Syria
were aware of Israeli SIGINT capabilities, the two countries decided
to refrain completely from exchanging messages by telephone, ra-
diotelephone, or cable.
The date set for the Egyptian-Syrian assault, 6 October, was cho-
sen only on 12 September or perhaps even as late as 1 or 2 October.
In any event, the final timing of the attack—2:00 P.M.—was not de-
cided until 3 October. The Syrians preferred an assault at dawn with
the sun behind them; the Egyptians preferred sunset. The compro-
mise struck was 2:00 P.M.
On the Israeli side, unlike DMI Zeira, who was convinced that
there was a low probability of an Egyptian-Syrian war being
launched against Israel, the director of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, was
less dismissive of Arab intentions.
Syrian deployments on the Golan Heights in September 1973 were
worrying enough for Israel to send extra infantry and tanks to the
Golan at the end of that month. These reinforcements, slight as they
were, were to make all the difference between holding the line and
utter defeat and the invasion of northern Israel on the first day of the
war. Yet even these reinforcements were not easy to authorize. Zamir
continued to express his concern over the Syrian buildup, contrary to
Zeira’s tranquilizing assessment of the situation as late as 3 October.
Zamir apparently tried to alert Meir to the situation, but the prime
minister told him to talk to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. The lat-
ter was influenced by his own optimistic assessments as well as those
of the MI and was slow to call up reserves.YOM KIPPUR WAR• 32506-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 325