Because the heads of IC agencies—except the CIA—reported di-
rectly to their policy principals, the DCI’s relative position in the White
House pecking order also came into play in the bureaucratic politics of
the intelligence community. This was especially so regarding the Pen-
tagon’s intelligence units, over which the secretary of defense
loomed—and still looms—large. From time to time, a particular secre-
tary of defense would give lip service to allowing the DCI greater au-
thority over the defense-related intelligence organizations, but no de-
fense secretary ever relinquished any significant amount of power to the
DCI. It took an act of Congress and substantial compromise finally to
get the Department of Defense to relinquish some authority and mon-
eys to the new DNI in 2004.
The DNI’s ability now to manage the IC in an effective way depends
largely on the president’s backing. This is so because the 2004 act pro-
vides for a substantially weaker DNI than that sought by the 9/11 Com-
mission report. Consequently, while the act endows the DNI ostensibly
with substantial power, the wielding of that power depends on presiden-
tial endorsement. Short of that, the DNI is a mere coordinator, reminis-
cent of the role the DCIs played for 58 years as titular heads of the IC.
The DNI’s authorities are now limited. Under the law, the DNI has a
say in hiring the heads of the intelligence agencies but has no authority
to fire them. The DNI can move money from one agency to another to
meet needs, but always within strict limits. Under the law, the DNI has
only limited authority to reprogram funds and transfer personnel from
the Defense Department, while the department still keeps control over
its massive intelligence agencies as well as 30 percent of intelligence
moneys. The DNI, under the law, is supposed to develop and determine
all agency budgets, but he is only empowered to monitor the imple-
mentation and execution of intelligence spending. Moreover, while the
legislation puts the new national intelligence chief in the position of
commanding the attention of agency heads, weakened authorities do not
assure greater intelligence coherence and effectiveness. Indeed, given
the weakness of law, the new position constitutes an additional bureau-
cratic layer, further separating the titular head of U.S. intelligence from
collectors and analysts who reside within the agencies.
Given the fluidity of the international order and the response of the
American government to it, it is almost certain that American intelli-
gence will continue to evolve in unpredictable ways in the near future.INTRODUCTION• liii05-398 (1) FM.qxd 10/20/05 6:14 AM Page liii