Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty - James B. Palais

(Darren Dugan) #1
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 1081

lands to freeholds by 1640 and ownership and leasing by 1750, pp. 5 I -61 for period of
enclosure from I 500-I 800, pp. 69-75 for the agricultural revolution of I560 to J760;
pp. 83-94 et passim for the development of commerce and industry between I660 and
1870; Aldo de Maddalena, "Rural Europe, 1500-1750," in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The
Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Glas-
gow: William Collins Sons, I974), pp. 300-304; Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Com-
merce: Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. vol. 2 (New York: Harper and
Row, 1982). esp. chap. 3.



  1. It even had its day in England from 1620 to I 720 or to the cnd of the Anglo-French
    War in 1763. See C. H. Wilson. "Trade, Society and the State," in The Cambridge Eco-
    nomic History of Europe 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I967):487-575;
    Fernand Braudel, Wheels (~lCommerce 2:542-49; Betty Behrens. "Government and Soci-
    ety," in E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. vol.
    5, The Economic Organization ()lEarly Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
    versity Press. I977):573-88, 595-97, 602.

  2. See Nakamura Takafusa. Economic Growth in Prewar Japan, trans. RobertA. Feld-
    man (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1971). In particular, see pp. 145,213-31 for
    post-WWI trends, but Takafusa blames the hoom and hust of the period from World War
    [through the Great Depression for the creation of monopoly formation and the wage or
    income differential of the double structure (advanced vs. modem economic sectors) rather
    than any intent on the part of the government. He also credits the Japanese government
    for marginal intervention to offset some of the more adverse effects on the urban prole-
    tariat in the second two decades of the twentieth century. hut its performance on that
    score was hardly impressive.

  3. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
    Peasants in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, I 967). Theda Skocpol
    also emphasized the role that entrenched landlords played in obstructing peasant revo-
    lutionary potential in France, China, Prussia, and England, in States and Social Revolu-
    thms: A Comparative Analysis ()l France, Russia, and China (Camhridge: Cambridge
    University Press. I979).
    5· Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. I, Liberatio/l and the Emer-
    gence (~lSeparate Regimes; vol. 2, The Roaring oj'the Cataract, T947-T950 (Princeton,
    N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. 1990).

  4. C. H. Wilson noted that in the age of mercantilism every Castilian burgher wanted
    to raise his family to hidalgo rank and purchase exemption from taxation. See C. H. Wil-
    son, "Trade, Society and the State," in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe 4
    (Cambridge: Camhridge University Press, T967):494. Fernand Braudel cited cases of suc-
    cessful merchants in the pre-capitalist age who bought fiefs to gain status in a lingering
    feudal environment, but this was slightly different from a landed gentry who were sup-
    posedly on the path to becoming capitalists, as Kim Yongsop argues. See Braudel, Wheels
    of Commerce 2:249. Thomas C. Smith showed how the gcJno, or rich peasants, in late
    Tokugawa Japan used their wealth to vie for samurai privileges and mimic the samurai
    life style, in The Agrarian Origins oj'Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
    1959), pp. J75-79·

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