but such expansion always awakened competition, and thus periods of expansion were
short-lived. Neither the Akkadian empire of the third millennium nor the Assyrian
empire of the first lasted more than a few centuries. The regions controlled by these
empires had very different borders, and both were brought to a swift end – as was
also the case for the geographically different, and even shorter-lived, empire of Samsi-
Addu of Assyria.
By contrast, the Egyptian state reveals a remarkable continuity. The same borders
were repeatedly re-established rapidly after each collapse, and even the periods of
decline lasted well over a century each at the end of the Old, Middle and New
Kingdoms. By contrast, the Egyptians never managed to penetrate deeply into the
lands of their neighbours (with the exception of Nubia, which was not really even a
state, let alone an empire).
The Egyptian capacity to expand was limited when the Egyptians came into contact
with neighbours, whereas the neighbours were the very source of the resilient defence
of identity in Mesopotamia. Constant struggle against neighbours meant that when
they were finally overcome, the empires would expand; a development which was not
impeded by the absence of easily recognised boundaries. Obviously, the fact that the
routes across the mountains and the deserts merged seamlessly into the local
communications system of Mesopotamia (as, for example, the Euphrates, the Diyala
and the Hamrin) was an essential feature of the Assyrian empire, but on a minor
scale this fact played a key role throughout Mesopotamian history. At the same time,
it left the borders undefined by geography with the result that a withdrawal to defined
limits was likewise excluded.
There are two issues involved in the construction of the empires: one is that of the
trade routes which moved materials from the Mediterranean and Anatolia to Meso-
potamia; the other is the geographical space of Syria through which the Euphrates
flowed. The occupation of Syria was the main issue throughout the Bronze Age, and
this geographical issue lay at the centre of the wars of the great Bronze Age warriors
(e.g., Naram-Sin, Samsi-Addu, Thutmosis III, Tukulti-Ninurta) who came into conflict
with those regions (e.g., Ebla, Aleppo, Mitanni) that were able to create major states
in the region.
There were certainly two complementary and related aspects of Bronze Age geo-
politics which differed from the situation of the Iron Age. One was the absence of
central power in Syria. The other was the balance of power which prevailed because
of the simultaneous existence of the other powers. During the early part of the second
half of the second millennium, Elam, Babylon, Assyria, Mitanni, Hatti and Egypt
were all major powers and all were in competition. A single movement by one power
could not destabilise the situation, because the others responded in a flexible fashion,
actually taking the other powers into account.
The situation was strikingly different in the Iron Age. Not only was there no major
power in Syria, but the major power of the Bronze Age, Egypt, was marginalised,
partially by fatigue and partially by internal divisions. The result was a power vacuum
in Anatolia and Syria with no major power in the north-eastern corner of Africa able
to move forcefully into the gap. The political situation of the Late Bronze Age had
been created by the Egyptian kings Thutmosis I, Thutmosis III and Amenophis II,
as their efforts had created the basis for the competition between Egypt, Mitanni and
Hatti, with repercussions in Babylon and Assyria.
— David A. Warburton —