Therefore, the absence of major states in Iron Age Syria and Egypt opened the way
for the larger empires. It is thus highly probable that the small states scattered across
western Asia at the end of the Bronze Age actually facilitated the growth of the
Assyrian empire. Lamprichs ( 1995 ) has argued that the Assyrian empire was built
on networks which had existed since the dawn of the Bronze Age. Once the Assyrians
overcame their initial setbacks, the fragmentary power structures of the scattered
states were easily defeated. The adoption of a ruthless policy of expansion meant that
the networks served imperial purposes. At this point, the incapacity to resist became
the mirror image of the former independence, and the networks allowed Nabopolassar,
Darius and Alexander to follow in the tracks of the Assyrians. The same conditions
that had facilitated the Assyrian expansion forced other powers to supplant the
Assyrians and to expand to similar levels. It was precisely the lack of competing
empires that meant that one succeeded the other. The alternative to expansion was
defeat; the multitude of conflicts in the Late Bronze Age had given way to the control
of empires. Thus the transformation of the system of empire in the Iron Age was
historically contingent, related to power structures and trade links rather than
technology or iron.
The most ironic event in Mesopotamian history was the establishment of the final
capital at Harran, far from the Assyrian homeland. This was only possible because
the Assyrian empire had been incorporated into the trade routes and thus Syria (rather
than the reverse).
Such a possibility was inconceivable for Egypt. In Egypt, the local identity was
sufficient to survive foreign occupation, and also sufficiently arrogant to avoid conflict.
Whereas the Hittites simply destroyed Mitanni, the Egyptians accepted it as a kind
of limit on their expansion. Whereas the Assyrian and Babylonian empires disappeared
without a trace when finally conquered, the Egyptian empire continued to exist as a
mind-set which obliged Greek kings and Roman emperors to behave like Egyptians.
This mind-set was also transferred into the Roman Empire in the form of such
activities as the Isis cult – but here the meaning of the cult was transformed once it
was out of the reach of the Egyptians. This was, at least partially, because the means
by which the Egyptians expressed their ideas were both ideologically and intellectually
quite different from the rest of the world – and again the explanation lies at least
partially in those borders.
As noted, the rest of the world adopted the Mesopotamian cuneiform writing
system and, indeed, a form of the Semitic Babylonian language – even the Egyptians,
and even for some of their own internal correspondence concerning Syria. Real Egyptian
thought was expressed in a different language and a different form of writing which
were basically inaccessible to the rest of the ancient world, and the Egyptians saw
no reason for others to master the system. At the same time, the intellectual experience
of verbal discourse, which was the ordinary means of communication in the rest of
the ancient world, was not the sole avenue accessible to the Egyptians. Like the other
great civilisations of antiquity, they used art and architecture to convey messages,
but they relied far more heavily on the principle in general, and even in their written
language – and it was thus inevitable that such messages would not be understood
by those who were not participants. Thus Egyptian communication was not based
upon discourse, but upon understanding by the initiated. Where they cared to dictate,
they did; elsewhere they were not concerned. Greek and Semitic communication, by
— Egypt and Mesopotamia —