Quest to Transform Southeast Asia } 219
Developments in Southeast Asia moved in a different direction. Following
Malaya’s independence in 1957 it signed a defense agreement with Britain, and
then began moving toward unity with the British protectorates of Sarawak
and Sabah on the west coast of Borneo Island. Sukarno felt that all of those
regions should be part of Indonesia. The new state of Malaysia was formed
in September 1963 when not only Sarawak and Sabah but also Singapore
joined peninsular Malaya to constitute that state. Sukarno viewed Malaysia
as a British contrivance cooked up to block Indonesia’s rise as the major re-
gional power. The same month Malaysia was formed, Sukarno declared a
policy of “confrontation” to “crush” that new state. Alliance with China, plus
Indonesia’s own military power, were the two key instruments of Sukarno’s
confrontation with Malaysia.^61
Sukarno’s drive to push the Western powers out of Southeast Asia fit well
with Mao’s plans for that region. A de facto alliance was formed in January
1963 during a visit by Sukarno to Beijing. When Malaysia was formed in
September and Sukarno declared confrontation with that state, Beijing
quickly supported Sukarno.^62 As the confrontation intensified in November
1964, Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Djakarta. The press release resulting
from Chen’s talks declared China’s full support for Indonesia’s struggle to
“crush” Malaysia. The entity constituted, Chen said, a direct threat to the
security of the Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, the two parties, China
and Indonesia, had reached a “common understanding” about the struggle
against imperialism and had discussed ways to increase the level of struggle.
Chen Yi also agreed to supply a much-needed US$50 million credit. In the
words of scholar David Mozingo, “As a result of these accords, China became
the major external force supporting Sukarno’s foreign policy.”^63
By fall 1964, Indonesian commandos were conducting raids on pen-
insular Malaya. Indonesian military forces were also massed on the bor-
ders of Sarawak and Sabah. Chinese media gave extensive coverage to the
“liberation struggle” in “North Kalimantan”—Djakarta’s and Beijing’s
name for Sarawak and Sabah. According to CPM Secretary General Chin
Peng, Beijing’s objective was to precipitate a war that would radicalize
the Indonesian military and society, creating fertile conditions for the
PKI, either in a united front with Sukarno or otherwise. In January 1965,
Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, a close Sukarno ally, reciprocated
Chen Yi’s visit. The joint statement produced by that visit went a step further
in stating China’s support for Indonesia’s confrontation: China solemnly
declared that should the British and US imperialists dare to impose war on
the Indonesian people, “the Chinese government and people would abso-
lutely not sit idly by.”^64 Following Subandrio’s visit, there was a steady flow
of exchange visits between the PLA and the Indonesian military. Beijing
was making a concerted effort to woo the Indonesian officer class, especially
its pro-Sukarno elements.