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1972 Joint Communiqué. Japan resisted this, fearing that such a clause would
antagonize Moscow. Japan’s traditional approach to the Soviet Union and
China in the late 1970s was “equidistance”—maintaining good relations with
both communist powers. Inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause in a treaty
with Beijing would tilt Japan toward China, possibly spoiling Soviet-Japan
relations, Tokyo feared. Huang Hua, foreign minister from 1976 to 1982 and
China’s principal in treaty negotiations with Japan in 1978, believed that
Tanaka had agreed to the anti-hegemony clause in 1972 in hopes that the
specter of a Japan-Chinese alignment would pressure Moscow into return-
ing the Northern Territories to Japan.^18 (The Northern Territories are four
islands at the southern end of the Kurile Island chain seized by the Soviet
Union in August 1945.) This hope had been destroyed by Moscow’s refusal
to return the islands. Growing Soviet military activities in the seas around
Japan and increasing Soviet belligerence was making Tokyo increasingly fear-
ful of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, in Huang Hua’s estimate. This made
Tokyo reluctant to further antagonize Moscow by including an anti-hege-
mony clause in a treaty with China. While Mao lived, Beijing was adamantly
opposed to any watering down of the anti-hegemony clause of the 1972 Joint
Declaration. Speaking to a senior Japanese parliamentarian in October 1975
(while Mao was still alive, reading reports on Deng’s words and actions, and
watching him closely for evidence of revisionism), Deng said:
The anti-hegemony provision in the Joint Declaration [of 1972] must be
included in the treaty of peace and friendship. This is precisely the crux
of ... the treaty, and is also one of the principled positions held by China.
If Japan finds it difficult to include it now, we can do it later ... Rather
than making this or that ambiguous interpretations, we would be better
of postponing the talks for the time being. We can’t retreat from the
Joint Declaration.^19
After Mao’s death and Deng’s recall to office in July 1977, Deng began
working for a breakthrough in relations with Japan. In the process, and with
Mao no longer looking over his shoulder, Deng would agree of inclusion
of “this or that ambiguous interpretation” in the treaty in order to address
Japan’s concerns about antagonizing Moscow. Early in 1978, CCP leaders
conducted an all-round domestic and international analysis of the situation
regarding Japan. It was decided that it was time to reopen the stalled peace
treaty negotiations and push for a resolution.^20 Deng began inviting to Beijing
and meeting with Japanese political leaders and businessmen judged sympa-
thetic to a treaty with China.^21 In discussions with these Japanese notables,
Deng stressed the importance of Sino-Japanese cooperation for the immedi-
ate economic interests of the two countries and for the long-term peace of
Asia. His message resonated with his Japanese guests. Deng also pressured
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda by identifying him to his Japanese visitors