364 { China’s Quest
as the key obstacle to achieving a treaty. Speaking to a delegation from the
opposition Japan Socialist Party, Deng expressed desire for the rapid conclu-
sion of a treaty, said this was what the people of Japan wanted, but concluded
“Now the problem is that Prime Minister Fukuda has to make a decision.”^22
To a visiting former chief cabinet secretary of the Japanese government, Deng
said: “The problem is that he [Fukuda] needs to make up his mind, and this
takes only a single second. We are waiting in anticipation.”^23
To address Japanese fears about antagonizing Moscow, Deng also gave
some critical ground on the anti-hegemony clause, permitting inclusion of
an “ambiguous interpretation” that he had ruled out in October 1975 while
Mao was still breathing. Beijing now informed Tokyo that, in China’s view,
since both countries had independent foreign policies, joint opposition to
hegemonism did not mean that the two governments would take united
action. When Japan conveyed this understanding to Moscow it mitigated
Soviet anger. Then, shortly before the final round of talks began in Beijing
between foreign ministers Huang Hua and Sunao Sonoda in August 1978,
Deng Xiaoping approved Japanese-proposed phraseology that further miti-
gated the impact of the anti-hegemony clause. Tokyo believed that extending
common opposition to hegemony in the whole world rather than restrict-
ing it to Asia-Pacific would make the clause less offensive to Moscow. Tokyo
therefore proposed that the words “or in other regions” be inserted after “Asia
and the Pacific” in delineating the geographic scope of their common op-
position to hegemony. Those words—“or in other regions”—were not in the
1972 Joint Communiqué, but were included in the 1978 treaty. In sum, Deng
had retreated from the 1972 Joint Declaration to get a deal with Japan. Huang
Hua conveyed this small but significant concession to Sonoda on August 9
and portrays it as the decisive move opening the way to a treaty. According
to Huang:
Hearing my statement, Sonoda was so excited that he got to his feet
and shook my hand, with tears in his eyes. He said: This visit of mine
has enabled me to remove formidable difficulties. I can admit that I am
gambling with ... my political life. ... I am deeply grateful to Huang
Hua for this message that contributes greatly to the conclusion of the
treaty.^24
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed by Huang Hua and Sonoda
on August 12, 1978. One of the first people to pass through the now open
door to Japan was Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s week-long visit to Japan in October
1978 came barely two months after the signature of the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship. It was the first visit by a top Chinese leader to Japan in the
2,000 years of relations between those two countries! It was also the first-ever
meeting between a top Chinese leader and an emperor of Japan. In this case,
the emperor was Hirohito, who had reigned during Japan’s aggression against