548 { China’s Quest
of impartiality, nonuse of force, and the consent of all belligerents. The
statement also proclaimed that the new Sino-Russia strategic partnership
was “not directed against any third country.^40 This was diplomatic cant sig-
naling that it was, in fact, directed against a third country.
Several years later, in July 2001, a Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation came very close to being a military alliance in the event of a
US-PRC clash over Taiwan. Signed by Jiang Zemin and new Russian presi-
dent Vladimir Putin, Article V of the treaty provided:
The Russian side affirms the inalterability of its principled position on
the Taiwan issue as presented in the political documents signed and
adopted by the heads of both states from 1992 to 2000. The Russian side
recognizes that there is only one China in the world ... and Taiwan is an
integral part of China. The Russian side opposes the independence of
Taiwan in any form.^41
Article IX provided:
If a situation emerges which, according to one of the agreeing sides,
poses a danger to peace, violates peace or infringes on interests of its
security and if a threat of aggression arises against one of the agreeing
sides, the agreeing sides will immediately make contact with each other
and hold consultations in order to eliminate the emerging threat.
This was in effect a pledge of Russian pro-Chinese neutrality in the event
of a US-PRC clash over Taiwan. Russia would certainly remain neutral in
such a conflict, but would, under the provisions of the 2001 treaty, continue
to provide China with the material wherewithal for resistance to the United
States.“Partnerships” with Other StatesThe successful formation of a strategic partnership with Russia seems to have
inspired a drive to form similar partnerships with other countries. Following
the proclamation of the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership, between 1996
and 2005 Beijing declared “partnerships” with thirty-two countries, as out-
lined by Figure 20-2. These partnerships were mostly with countries that
Beijing considered important, thus “strategic,” and which Beijing hoped would
remain committed to cooperation with China whatever vicissitudes in inter-
national affairs might arise. A key purpose of these partnerships seems to have
been to insulate to some degree China’s economic and political relations with
these countries from any conflict that might emerge between the PRC and the
United States.^42 Beijing seems to have been trying to increase the possibility
that, in the event of a conflict between China and the United States, its “stra-
tegic partners” would still carry on economic and other ties with China. From