594 { China’s Quest
changed and was a new party that would not repeat past mistakes. Old styles
of CCP operation—cursing, threatening, or attempting to suppress “incor-
rect” thinking—were to be set aside. CCP activists and propagandists should
strive to win friends, not make enemies.
Xu himself learned a new style of politics: attending banquets large and
small, giving public speeches, writing personal letters to local notables, and
listening tolerantly to even the most reactionary views. Eventually Xu’s New
Year’s card mailing list numbered three to four thousand people, with gifts
going out to a smaller set of acquaintances, and potted peonies going to a still
smaller set of well-known public figures. Xu’s CCP organization set up delega-
tions of Hong Kong notables, including rightists and skeptics, to visit Beijing,
where Xu lobbied to have them received by top Chinese leaders who stressed
the sincerity of the “one country, two systems” arrangement. Skeptics of Hong
Kong’s return to China were a special target of CCP united courtship. Xu lob-
bied effectively with Deng Xiaoping for his intervention to prevent individual
and prominent CCP leaders from making offhand and unauthorized remarks
about Hong Kong that sometimes contradicted the official line. Xu directed
the Bank of China to increase lending to small and medium-sized Hong Kong
enterprises. Left-wing labor unions held symposia and rallies supporting
Hong Kong’s return to China. The political message behind this conviviality
was this: the “one country, two systems” arrangement fits China’s interests, fits
Hong Kong’s interests, and comports with the interests of all Chinese patriots
in ending China’s Century of National Humiliation. Xu felt acutely the huge
difficulty of shifting Hong Kong opinion in the CCP’s favor: “I came to feel
deeply that it would be easy to secure the land of Hong Kong, but very difficult
to win over the people of Hong Kong.”^34
Britain tried repeatedly to play the “public opinion card” to pressure China
at the negotiating table, in Xu Jiatun’s view. London first proposed that a dele-
gation representing the people of Hong Kong participate in the Anglo-Chinese
negotiations on the reversion of Hong Kong, a formulation the British called
a “three-legged stool.” China rejected this. The talks involved the return of
Hong Kong to China, and involved only the governments of the two coun-
tries. Britain’s “three-legged stool” proposal was an attempt to “split” Hong
Kong opinion and align a portion of that opinion against China at the negoti-
ating table. When that ploy failed, Britain proposed that it return sovereignty
to China in exchange for China granting Britain a role in administering
Hong Kong beyond 1997. “Overnight Hong Kong was inundated with talk
and programs representing the British stand,” Xu wrote.^35 Then the British
Hong Kong government remained passive—according to Xu—as the value
of the Hong Kong dollar declined and long lines of panicky Hong Kongers
formed outside banks to withdraw US dollars or change Hong Kong dollars
into US dollars. At the negotiating table, Britain again pointed to this to argue
for a continuing British role. Xu Jiatun ordered his organization to expose