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the British scheme via CCP-controlled media and statements by prominent
PRC representatives visiting Hong Kong. London was forced to shift course
and link the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar, quickly stabilizing its value.^36
Robin McLaren, on the other hand, argues that the British Hong Kong gov-
ernment “intervened heavily” to support the currency, while China offered
“no support” and charged that the currency crisis was “artificial, manufac-
tured by the British to put pressure on China.”^37
The final variant of Britain’s “public opinion card” was, in Xu’s view, its
“democracy card.” This centered on transforming Hong Kong’s Legislative
Council (LegCo) into a center of power able to check and balance the chief
executive, who was controlled, as noted earlier, by Beijing. London’s “democ-
racy card” was, in Xu Jiatun’s view, a “brilliant public opinion card” which
worked by intensifying Hong Kong’s social divisions and unrest” over the
looming China takeover. London’s playing the “democracy card” “touched
off a wave of democracy unparalleled in Hong Kong’s history.” Throughout,
the British objective was to divide public opinion to argue for its proposals
at the negotiating table. The Chinese objective was, of course, to unite public
opinion behind it, according to Xu.
The Beijing Massacre precipitated a major challenge from PBSC conser-
vatives to Xu Jiatun’s tolerant approach to CCP united front work. Already
in 1986, Xu’s open-minded approach had been criticized during a Politburo
retreat at Beidaihe. Lu Ping and Li Hao, director and deputy director re-
spectively of the State Council’s Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs,
and Zhou Nan, vice foreign minister and head of China’s negotiations with
Britain, challenged Xu’s proposition that the people of Hong Kong feared
the territory’s return to China. The truth, they insisted, was that the people
of Hong Kong welcomed and were “impatient” for Hong Kong’s return to
China. Xu was betraying the country by his lenient approach toward anti-
communist and other reactionary elements in Hong Kong.^38 This criticism
came in the context of the push to purge Hu Yaobang for his liberal attitude
toward anticommunists and other reactionaries. Xu was being tarred as one
of Hu Yaobang’s liberal ilk.^39 By the second half of 1989, after 6-4 and the fall
of Zhao Ziyang, Xu came under increasing criticism for “right deviation.”^40
As prodemocracy demonstrations swelled in Beijing in April–May 1989,
the “patriotic torrent swept most people of Hong Kong along with it and
swept across every corner of Hong Kong, creating an unprecedented situa-
tion,” according to Xu.^41 When the PLA crushed the Beijing demonstrations
in June, “The people of Hong Kong became disappointed to an unprecedented
degree” and Hong Kong was swept by democratic movement in an “unprece-
dented development.” Xu feared the repression in Beijing would undo all that
had been accomplished by six years of united front work. To make matters
worse, Li Peng began ordering Xu to take a hard line toward the Hong Kong
democracy demonstrations. Xu believed this was a recipe for disaster.