Long Debate over the US Challenge } 651
Guangzhou. The US embassy in Beijing seemed for several hours to be in
danger of being stormed by a mob and began to burn classified and sensi-
tive documents.^24 Outside Xian in China’s northwest, where Boeing Aircraft
had a joint venture with a Chinese firm to produce airplane tail assemblies,
a local official offered to provide armed escort for foreign personnel work-
ing at the facility. This led the US director to move immediately to prepare
the evacuation of his expatriate personnel from China.^25 Foreign business-
men across China watched with trepidation as popular anti-US, and perhaps
anti-foreign, rage gripped China for several days. Some older Chinese who
remembered the xenophobia set loose by the Cultural Revolution trembled at
the thought that such a force was again being unleashed.
After several days, the media conveyed news of the several US apologies,
the buses no longer ferried in crowds, and the demonstrations ended. In
mid-June, a US presidential special envoy arrived in Beijing to give an expla-
nation of how the incident had occurred. Late the next month, an agreement
on compensation was agreed on, with the United States providing compen-
sation for loss of life and injury to persons and Chinese diplomatic property.
A year later, the CIA analyst responsible for using out-of-date data was fired.
More significantly, in November 1999 President Clinton reversed position on
Zhu Rongji’s WTO package deal, and accepted the Chinese offer.
The bombing of China’s embassy precipitated an intense debate over policy
toward the United States.^26 Though triggered by the embassy bombing, the de-
bate touched on apprehensions about the United States that had been growing
since the end of the Cold War. One opinion group in the debate pointed to a
long series of US actions as proof of US hostility to China. The litany of US
threats to China included (along with other items already discussed) recon-
figuration of the US-Japan alliance, with China in mind; India’s nuclear deto-
nation in 1998 and improvements in US-India ties; Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state”
theory, announced in July 1999; and, of course, US-led NATO intervention
in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, with its ominous implications for China
itself. Washington’s Kosovo intervention was proof that the United States was
intent on achieving global hegemony via military means. The United States
and its NATO allies were bent on ignoring international sovereignty norms
and the authority of the UN Security Council, and were intervening across
the world to achieve domination. Taken together, these US moves indicated
deep US hostility toward the PRC. A confrontation with the United States was
likely or even inevitable, and China needed to prepare for it.
This conclusion touched on the balance between economic development
and military modernization and preparation. Advocates of the hard-line
anti-US position argued that much greater budgetary emphasis needed to
be given to military preparedness. Some argued for equal emphasis on eco-
nomic development and military preparedness. Others argued that the hos-
tile international environment meant that the PRC could no longer afford to