652 { China’s Quest
give priority to economic development, and military preparedness had to
be the top priority. In terms of diplomacy, hard-liners charged that China’s
government had been laying too much emphasis on cultivating ties with the
United States at the expense of ties with the Third World. China should also
work harder to split the Europeans from Washington. The United States was
in slow decline and need not be greatly feared, the hard-liners said.
Moderate voices in this debate did not dispute that the United States was
doing all sorts of terrible things to the world and to China. There was a virtual
consensus among participants in the debate that all major deleterious changes
in China’s security environment (regarding Japan, India, Taiwan, Europe, etc.)
were a function of the actions and intentions of a malevolent United States.
None of the participants in the debate argued that the United States genuinely
sought partnership with a strong and secure China. Moderate voices differed
from the hard-liners, rather, on whether a confrontation with the United
States, at least in the near term, was the best course for China. Moderate
voices argued that confrontation with the United States could and should be
avoided. Peace and development were still the main trend in the international
situation, they said. China still needed to focus on economic development for
some long period of time. The regional conflicts and big-power interventions
pointed to by the hard-liners did not reflect the main trend—the declining
probability of war among the major powers, including a superpower attack
on China. Regional wars and big-power intervention had always been going
on and would probably continue for a long time yet. But the risk that China
would confront a superpower attack had been greatly reduced. China was
strong. All foreign sanctions imposed after 6-4 had been lifted. Hong Kong
had been successfully recovered. China had forged “partnerships” with major
countries around the world. The European countries were losing interest
in sponsoring human rights resolutions with the United States. China had
forged the Shanghai Five. Jiang Zemin had been well received in the United
States, and Clinton had publicly affirmed the “three noes.” In short, China
was no longer weak or isolated. The United States would find little or no sup-
port for military adventures against China. China was not Serbia. China had
nuclear weapons and powerful military forces. It followed that conflict with
the United States was neither close at hand nor inevitable. China needed to
remain vigilant against US adventurism, of course, but China’s security had
not deteriorated as a result of Kosovo. Other analysts pointed out that a huge
gap still existed between PRC and US comprehensive national power, and that
a confrontation with the United States in the near term would be a disaster
for China.
The debate was drawn to a close in August 1999 at the annual leadership
meeting at Beidaihe. Following that meeting, a new internal eight-character
guideline was issued: “three no changes and three new changes” (sange bu
bian, sange bianhua). Unchanged elements of the international situation